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CROUCHING TIGERS AND HIDDEN DRAGONS ON  
THE GREAT WALL STREET: 
DECODING THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Yueh-Ping (Alex) Yang＊ 
Abstract: As China’s economic influence on the world grows, its system of state 
capitalism is likewise receiving increasing scrutiny. Behind the state capitalism, China’s 
banking sector, the “Great Wall Street”—parallel to the “Wall Street” in the United States— 
plays a fundamental role in financing and supporting China’s economy. Contemporary 
studies of China’s state capitalism, however, focus mainly on Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, leaving less attention specific to China’s state-owned banking sector which 
adopts a rather different corporate governance practice. In this paper, I conduct a 
comprehensive and critical review of the bank governance practice in China. Statutorily, 
Chinese commercial banks generally follow corporate governance best practices, including 
the requirement of independent directors and board sub-committees and the separation 
between chairpersons and CEOs. In reality, however, the Chinese party-state manages to 
dominate Chinese commercial banks by shifting the power center to the executive team, 
capturing power through its appointment and reward system, and separating the ownership 
from control. External governance mechanisms, such as market competition, bank 
regulation and supervision, and hostile takeovers, are inadequate to pose an effective 
constraint on the Chinese party-state. Under this practice, the Chinese party-state 
dominates Chinese commercial banks in a less visible manner and thus becomes the 
“Hidden Dragon” behind the Great Wall Street. In contrast, private capital, which is also a 
significant source of investment, only possesses marginal influence on the operational 
decision of Chinese commercial banks and thus becomes the “Crouching Tiger” on the 
Great Wall Street. Based on these observations, this article critically assesses this 
Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model from an agency theory prospective. I identify 
three special agency problems underlying this model, including the misalignment between 
the public welfare vis-à-vis party-state’s interest, between the party-state’s interest vis-à-
vis bank executives’ interest, and between the bank executives’ interest vis-à-vis the banks’ 
interest. These special agency problems, in turn, account for the current challenges faced 
by China’s banking sector, including the rising risk exposure, the financial constraint of 
private sectors, and the lack of business innovation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, no one would ever underestimate the economic influence of 
China. After four decades of super growth, China’s gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) has skyrocketed to US $12.24 trillion as of the end of 2017.1 China 
now represents 15.17% of the world GDP2 and is the second largest economy 
in the world.3 The stunning growth of China’s economy has given birth to 
many enormous Chinese companies. In 2016, 103 of Fortune’s Global 500 
companies were Chinese.4 Furthermore, after the Global Financial Crisis of 
2008-2009 seriously hit the United States and the European Union, China 
became a major contributor to sustaining global economic growth: between 
2010 and 2017, the net growth of the world GDP was US $14.73 trillion,5 of 
which China contributed US $6.15 trillion,6 or 42%. The world economy has 
become so entangled with China that when China sneezes, the world catches 
a cold. 
Bank lending is the engine fueling China’s economy.7 In 2016, China’s 
bank credits equaled 157% of China’s GDP,8 while in the United States, this 
figure was only 53%.9 In contrast, the market capitalization of listed domestic 
companies equaled only 71% of China’s GDP in 2017,10 while in the United 
States this figure was 166%.11 Consequently, unlike the United States where 
                                                 
1 GDP – China, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP. 
CD?locations=CN (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
2 In 2017, the world GDP was US $80.68 trillion. GDP–World, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
3 Gross Domestic Product 2017, WORLD BANK (Sept. 21, 2018), 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf. 
4 FORTUNE GLOBAL 500, http://fortune.com/global500/2016/list/filtered?hqcountry= 
China&sortBy=assets (last visited Sept. 18, 2017). Four of the ten largest companies in the world by assets 
came from China, including the largest company, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”). Id. 
5 GDP – World, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, supra note 2. 
6 GDP – China, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, supra note 1. 
7 See generally Franklin Allen et al., China’s Financial System: Growth and Risk, 9 FOUNDATIONS 
AND TRENDS® IN FINANCE 197 (2015) (providing an overview of China’s overall financial system, including 
a review of current status of the bank loan market and capital market in China). 
8 Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks – China, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=CN (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
9 Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks – US, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS?locations=US (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). 
10 Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies – China, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?contextual=default&locations=CN (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2018). 
11 Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies – US, WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
http://data.worldbank. org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?contextual=default&locations=US (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2018). 
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economic activities obtain funds mainly from direct finance and capital 
markets, China’s economy heavily relies on indirect financing and banks.12 
The composition of funding sources in China’s non-financial sectors is even 
more telling. As of the end of 2017, China’s non-financial sectors received 
RMB 175 trillion in financing from the financial sector,13 of which loans 
accounted for 69.6% while corporate bonds accounted for only 10.5% and 
stock accounted for only 3.8%.14 
Furthermore, China’s banking sector now represents a huge portion of 
China’s economy. As of January 24, 2018, there were 25 Chinese commercial 
banks listed on China’s stock market,15 which is an extremely small portion 
compared to 3,573 listed companies.16 That said, as of the same date, the total 
market value of these banks reached RMB 12.14 trillion,17 which accounted 
for 17.7% of the total market value in China’s stock market. 18  The 
profitability of these banks is even more stunning. By the end of the first half 
of 2017, the net profits of the listed banks accounted for 46% of the overall 
stock market profits.19 The banking sector is, in fact, the most crucial sector 
in China now.  
Despite the tremendous importance of China’s banking sector, little 
corporate governance literature addresses how the corporate governance of 
                                                 
12 To be fair, China is not exceptional on this point. Many advanced countries, such as Japan and 
Australia, adopt this bank-based model as well. In Japan, bank credits equaled 103% of Japan’s GDP in 2016; 
in 1998, this figure was a staggering 196%. In Australia, this figure was 141% in 2017. 
13 PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, 2017 NIAN SHEHUI RONGZI GUIMO CUNLIANG TONGJI SHUJU BAOGAO 
(2017 年社会融资规模存量统计数据报告) [THE STATISTICS REPORT OF THE SCALE OF SOCIAL FINANCE 
STOCK AS OF 2017] (2018). 
14 Id. 
15 Commercial Bank List, HEXUN, http://datainfo.stock.hexun.com, follow link, then click “股票” 
(Stocks), followed by “数据频道” (Data Channels), then “行业板块” (Industry Sector), then follow the “二
级行业” (Second Industry) hyperlink. (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
16 Companies Listed on the Chinese Stock Market, HEXUN, http://datainfo.stock.hexun.com, follow 
link, then click “股票” (Stocks), followed by “数据频道” (Data Channels), then follow the link for “行业板
块” (Industry Sector) (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
17 Commercial Bank List, HEXUN, supra note 15. 
18 As of this date, the total market value of China’s stock market was RMB 68.43 trillion. Companies 
Listed, HEXUN, supra note 16. 
19 Lin Zehong (林則宏), Yinhang chao zhuan zhan A gu banshu huo li (銀行超賺 占 A股半數獲利) 
[Banks are Super Profitable, Accounting for Half of the Profits of A–Stock], ECON. DAILY (經濟日報), Sept. 
5, 2017. 
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Chinese commercial banks functions in practice. The world is undoubtedly 
aware that China remains an authoritarian regime dominated by the Chinese 
Communist Party (“CCP”), which formulates a unique party-state regime.20 
A rich body of literature also discusses how the CCP, under this political 
setting, intervenes in China’s economy through the so-called “state capitalism” 
and formulates a unique corporate governance regime. 21  These studies, 
however, mainly focus on Chinese state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), 
especially the central SOEs owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (“SASAC”),22 leaving a 
vacuum in the studies of bank governance in China.23  
While Chinese commercial banks also share some characteristics with 
state capitalism, their corporate governance practice is different than that of 
Chinese SOEs in at least three aspects. First, institutionally, they do not belong 
to the SASAC system;24 instead, they belong to a fragmented system. The 
five largest Chinese commercial banks—i.e., the state-owned commercial 
                                                 
20 See generally RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST 
RULERS (2010) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the CCP’s influence in China’s political regime). 
21 See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013); Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and 
Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career Approach, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013); Curtis 
J, Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 
665 (2015); Li-Wen Lin, Behind the Numbers: State Capitalism and Executive Compensation in China, 12 
U. PENN ASIAN L. REV. 140 (2016). See also REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds. 2015). 
22 See, e.g., Lin & Milhaupt, We are the (National) Champions, supra note 21; Lin, Behind the 
Numbers, supra note 21. 
23 For a rare piece of legal literature addressing the corporate governance of Chinese commercial banks, 
see generally Nicholas Calcina Howson, China’s Restructured Commercial Banks: Nomenklatura 
Accountability Serving Corporate Governance Reform?, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
CHALLENGES AND GLOBAL IMPACT 123 (Zhu Min et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the existence of the Chinese 
Communist Party in the direction of Chinese state-owned enterprises after their corporatization). See also 
JAMES STENT, CHINA’S BANKING TRANSFORMATION: THE UNTOLD STORY (2017) (providing a 
comprehensive introduction of the corporate governance practices in a number of major Chinese commercial 
banks). 
24 SASAC is a state agency instead of a state holding company and is thus more politics-oriented. 
Compared with SOCBs, the corporate governance practice of SASAC-owned SOEs is even less disciplined. 
These SOEs are less concerned with their shareholders’ interests: for instance, few of them regularly 
distribute dividends. In contrast, the Central Huijin pushes the commercial performance of SOCBs harder. In 
particular, it is more concerned with shareholders’ interests, this is reflected in SOCBs’ regular distribution 
of dividends. This is perhaps because MOF issued special bonds to establish the CIC for purchasing Central 
Huijin from the PBOC, which imposes financial pressure on Central Huijin to generate cash flow for repaying 
the bonds and thus aligns the interest of Central Huijin with ordinary financial investors. See CARL E. 
WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA’S 
EXTRAORDINARY RISE 171–73 (2011), for a comparison between the SASAC model and Huijin model.  
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banks (“SOCBs”)25—are mainly controlled by the Central Huijin Investment 
Company (“Central Huijin”), a subsidiary of Central Investment Company 
(“CIC”) controlled by the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”).26 Many local banks 
are controlled by the corresponding local government.27 There are also many 
commercial banks controlled by an SOE28 or a state agency.29 Second, in 
terms of ownership structure, private capital investment in Chinese 
commercial banks is far more robust than in Chinese SOEs. Many major 
banks have not only public investors but also private block-holder(s). Among 
the 35 largest commercial banks in China, 22 of them have a private block-
holder owning 5% or more of the bank’s shares (see Annex 1). 30  Such 
diversified ownership structure of Chinese commercial banks influences the 
bank governance practice. For instance, many private block-holders appoint 
their representatives to sit on the board of directors, which diversifies the 
board composition among Chinese commercial banks.31 Third, in terms of 
market competition, competition in the banking sector is far more robust. 
Unlike most SOEs, which only compete with one or two other SOEs in a 
similar market, the banking market in China is far less monopolistic. As of the 
end of 2016, there were 4,399 banking institutions in China.32 Even if we 
focus on the national banking market, China still had 17 national banks at the 
time.33 In light of the above, corporate governance of Chinese commercial 
banks presents a different picture with that of Chinese SOEs.  
China’s bank governance model is of particular importance in light of 
the prospective SOE reform in China. Despite political turbulence, the CCP 
                                                 
25 These banks are: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), China Construction Bank 
(“CCB”), Agriculture Bank of China (“ABC”), Bank of China (“BOC”), and Bank of Communications 
(“BoCom”). 
26 On its incorporation in 2003, Central Huijin was mainly operated by the PBOC, then its sole owner. 
After MOF issued special bonds to raise the funds for CIC to purchase Central Huijin’s ownership from the 
PBOC in 2007, Central Huijin became mainly operated by MOF. 
27 For example, the controlling shareholder of the Industrial Bank is the Bureau of Finance of Fujian 
Province. The controlling shareholder of the Shanghai Pudong Bank is the Shanghai City through its SOEs. 
28 An example is the CITIC Bank whose controlling shareholder is the CITIC Group, an SOE owned 
by MOF. 
29 An example is the Merchant Bank whose controlling shareholder is the Bureau of Merchant. 
30 I use five percent as the criterion here because Chinese laws define “major shareholders” as 
shareholders possessing five percent or more ownership. Shangye yinhang gongsi zhili zhiyin (商业银行公
司治理指引) [Guidelines on Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks] (promulgated by China Banking 
Regulatory Comm’n, July 5, 2011, effective July 5, 2011), CLI.4.184094(EN) (Lawinfochina).  
31 See infra Section II.B. 
32 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2016 27 (2017) [hereinafter 
CBRC 2016 REPORT]. 
33 These are the five SOCBs and twelve joint-stock commercial banks (“JSCBs”). 
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consistently declares its commitment to reform Chinese SOEs as a way to 
invigorate China’s economy.34 Commentators often considered the Huijin 
model implemented in China’s financial sector more successful than the 
SASAC model implemented in non-financial SOEs. 35  Accordingly, the 
prospective SOE reform in China is also likely to track the corporate 
governance model implemented in China’s banking sector.36 A study that 
specifically addresses the corporate governance practice of Chinese 
commercial banks, thus, is warranted. 
In this paper, I attempt to fill this void by detailing the interaction 
between two major players in Chinese bank governance: the Chinese party-
state and private capital. On one hand, despite the more diversified ownership 
structure and more robust market competition, the Chinese party-state 
continues to dominate Chinese commercial banks.37 Most importantly, such 
dominance comes less from the state’s ownership than from the party’s 
                                                 
34 In its 2013 Decision, the CCP declared its intention to initiate another round of SOE reforms, which 
aimed to develop mixed ownership composed of the government and other non-government owners, such as 
employee ownership. The purpose was to form co-ownership of enterprises between capitalists and labor. 
See CCP Central Committee Resolution Concerning Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Deepening 
Reform, CHINA COPYRIGHT AND MEDIA (Nov. 15, 2013), [hereinafter 2013 Decision] 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/15/ccp-central-committee-resolution-concerning-
some-major-issues-in-comprehensively-deepening-reform/; see also Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan 
guanyu shenhua guoyou qiye gaige de zhidao yijian (中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意
见) [Guiding Opinions of the Central Comm. of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on 
Deepening State–Owned Enterprise Reform] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 24, 2015, effective 
Aug. 24, 2015), CLI.5.256926(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Deepening SOE Reform Opinion]; Guo 
wuyuan guanyu guoyou qiye fazhan hunhe suoyouzhi de yijian (国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经
济的意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Developing the Mixed Ownership Economy by State-Owned 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 23, 2015, effective Sept. 24, 2015) CLI.2.257547(EN) 
(Lawinfochina); Guowuyuan bangong ting gong guanyu jinyibu wanshan guoyou qiye faren zhili jiegou de 
zhidao yijian (国务院办公厅关于进一步完善国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions on 
the Corporate Governance Structure of State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Office of the State 
Council, Apr. 24, 2017, effective May 3, 2017), 2017 Guobanfa 36. 
35 See Deng Feng, Indigenous Evolution of SOE Regulation, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 3, 14–17 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt eds., 2015). 
36 According to the Deepening SOE Reform Opinion, the future SOE reform in China will transform 
the function of SASAC into focusing on administering “investment.” Deepening SOE Reform Opinion, supra 
note 34, ¶ 12. Some commentators consider that this transformation of the SASAC’s function might track 
the Huijin model. See, e.g., Nie Riming (聂日明), Guoqi gaige xiang danmaxi xue shenme? (国企改革向淡
马锡学什么？) [What to Learn from Temasek for SOE Reforms?], SOUTHERN METROPOLIS DAILY (南方都
市报), Sept. 17, 2015. 
37 STENT, supra note 23, at 39 (observing that “today the role of the Party in Chinese banks is one of 
the distinguishing features of the Chinese banking system.”) 
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function as a human resource headquarter.38 By holding de facto control over 
the appointment and reward of top executives of Chinese commercial banks, 
the party-state obtains influence over banks, regardless of the ownership 
structure of a bank and regardless of the best practices of corporate 
governance adopted therein. The party-state’s influence is generally less 
visible to outsiders, which makes “Hidden Dragon” a proper metaphor for 
describing the party-state’s role in China’s banking sector. Recently, however, 
increasing attention has been given to this “Hidden Dragon” after a number 
of Chinese SOEs amended their articles of incorporation and acknowledged 
the establishment, function, and power of the party committee in their 
operation.39 
On the other hand, despite its significant ownership, private capital only 
plays a marginal role in China’s banking sector. China’s banking sector has 
witnessed significant participation from private capital in the past two decades. 
By the end of 2015, private capital held about 70% of small and medium banks’ 
shares.40 Specifically, private capital accounted for 53% of city commercial 
banks’ ownership, 90% of rural cooperatives’ ownership, and 72% of 
township banks’ ownership.41 According to the Chinese Banking Regulatory 
Commission (“CBRC”), the entry of private capital into the banking industry 
has become “normalized.”42 However, the influence of these Tigers on the 
Great Wall Street does not match their ownership. Among major Chinese 
commercial banks, they rarely possess the power to dominate the management 
team of Chinese banks.43 The reason is simple: the Chinese party-state does 
not want a powerful private sector that could compromise its dominance over 
the economy and financial system in China. Under this rationale, Tigers could 
only “crouch,” awaiting the Hidden Dragon’s permission to rise. 
                                                 
38 See infra Section II.B. 
39 See Jennifer Hughes, China’s Communist Party Writes Itself into Company Law, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 
14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4b28218-80db-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd. In short, in 2017, a 
number of Chinese SOEs, including some Chinese commercial banks, wrote the party committee into their 
articles of incorporation. According to these amendments, the bank shall establish a party organization, that 
is, the party committee, which, in turn, possesses a number of powers, including that the board of directors 
shall consult the party committee’s opinion before deciding on the bank’s major issues. In this way, the party 
committee becomes a corporate organ required by the corporate charter, which is more institutionalized than 
before. Id. For a more detailed description, see infra Section II.A.e. 
40 CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2015 39 (2016). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Among the top 35 largest commercial banks in China, private capital only controls the Ping An Bank 
and Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank. 
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Based on the above observations, I offer a critical view of this 
“Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon” model of bank governance in China. The 
Chinese party-state might be satisfied with this model. This model allows it 
to impose party-state policies on Chinese commercial banks, which might not 
always serve banks’ interest but may enhance the overall public welfare.44 
Nevertheless, in recent years, there are some warning signals cautioning the 
Chinese party-state from being overconfident in this model. For instance, this 
model orients the operation of Chinese banks toward the party’s interest, 
which can involve political interests that do not concern social welfare or may 
even harm it. The enhanced political intervention, in turn, results in the rapid 
rise of bad loans among Chinese banks and the financial constraint of China’s 
private sectors.45 Moreover, this model prevents Chinese banks from having 
a more diversified executive composition, which compromises the business 
innovation and diversity of Chinese banks. 46  These concerns seem 
controllable at this moment, but the Chinese party-state better nip this evil in 
the bud before it causes systemic instability. 
I will structure this paper as follows. In Part II, I will review the internal 
governance practice of Chinese commercial banks. I will illustrate both the 
governance in statutes, and in practice, to explain how the Chinese party-state 
gets around the related corporate laws to dominate Chinese commercial banks. 
In Part III, I will review the external governance mechanisms in China’s 
banking sector. I will analyze the market competition in both the banking 
market and the capital market, the regulatory intervention, and the obstacles 
to hostile takeovers in China, illustrating how their function is limited under 
the Chinese party-state system. In Part IV, I will discuss the problems 
associated with this Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model. I will focus on 
the three specific types of agency problems of this model and illustrate how 
these problems lead to the rising risk exposure among Chinese commercial 
banks, the financial constraint of China’s private sectors, and the lack of 
business innovation and diversity in China’s banking sector. Part V concludes 
by urging a reform of this model in China. Through these analyses, this paper 
                                                 
44 This echoes article 34 of the Commercial Banks Law, which requires Chinese commercial banks to 
“conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national economic and social 
development and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State.” Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
shangye yinhang fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial 
Banks] (promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Eighth National People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, effective 
July 1, 1995; amended by Standing Comm. of Tenth National People's Congress, Dec. 27, 2003; amended by 
Standing Comm. of Twelfth National People's Congress on Aug. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Commercial Banks 
Law], art. 34, CLI.1.256594(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
45 See infra Section IV.B.a. 
46 See infra Section IV.B.c. 
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broadens the studies on China’s state capitalism from a banking perspective 
and lays down a foundation for future research of China’s banking reform and 
SOE reform. 
II. INTERNAL GOVERNANCE OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS—TIGERS 
DOWN TO LEVEL LAND 
A Chinese saying goes, “a tiger going down to the level land would be 
insulted by dogs,” which describes that a powerful person, when losing his or 
her power, can be easily insulted by villains. This depicts the plight of the 
Tigers—that is, private capital—on the Great Wall Street. 
After decades of evolution, Chinese commercial banks have attracted 
enormous investments from private capital. As of 2017, up to 41 Chinese 
banks have listed themselves in Hong Kong, Shanghai, or Shenzhen.47 In 
addition, according to the CBRC’s investigation, as of 2015, private capital 
held the majority shares of more than 100, or 70%, of small and medium 
commercial banks.48 These figures seem to suggest that private capital has 
taken over the Great Wall Street. That notion, however, is not the reality. 
This Section will explore the practice of bank governance in China. It 
will illustrate how, after four decades of banking reform, the Chinese party-
state, or the Dragon, maintains its dominance and marginalizes private capital, 
the Tigers, thereby contributing to the “Crouching-Tigers-Hidden-Dragons” 
model of bank governance in China.  
A. Governance on the Books 
The laws governing the corporate governance of Chinese commercial 
banks are mainly the Company Act, amended in 2013; Guiding Principles on 
Governance of Listed Companies, promulgated in 2002; and CBRC’s 
Guidance on Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks, promulgated in 
2013. In general, these laws resemble the best practices promoted in the West 
and reflect the shareholder-oriented model,49 though with some variations. 
                                                 
47 See ERNST & YOUNG, CHINA, LISTED BANKS IN CHINA: 2017 REVIEW AND OUTLOOK 1 (2018) (for 
a list of these 41 banks). 
48 CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 32, at 39. 
49 Hansmann and Kraakman classified corporate governance practices into five main categories: 
shareholder-oriented, manager-oriented, labor-oriented, state-oriented, and stakeholder-oriented models. 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).  
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Chart 1 illustrates the basic governance structure of Chinese banks provided 
in these laws.  
Chart 1: Corporate Governance Structure of Chinese Commercial Banks on the Books 
 
Note: The solid line indicates the power to appoint the arrowed subject 
The dotted line indicates the obligation to report to the arrowed subject. 
Bank governance in China has adopted the two-tier board system.50 As 
Chart 1 shows, the decision-making body of a bank consists of the 
shareholders’ meeting on the top, 51  the board of directors and board of 
supervisors in the middle in charge of managerial and supervisory affairs52 
respectively, and the senior management in charge of daily operational affairs 
just above the employees.53 This model has three characteristics. First, in 
China, employees are also entitled to appoint, unfettered by shareholders, a 
number of employee supervisors to the board of supervisors. 54  This is 
                                                 
50 See John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, 
in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 49, 50–51 (Reinier 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2017) (for a brief comparison between the one-tier and two-tier board). 
51 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongsi fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law of The People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2013, effective Mar. 
1, 2014) [hereinafter Company Law], art. 99, www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html (China). 
52 Id. arts. 109, 118. 
53 Id. arts. 50, 114. 
54 Id. art. 118. 
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reminiscent of the supervisory boards in Germany.55 Second, unlike the two-
tier board model in Germany, however, the one in China resembles the 
Japanese or Taiwanese model, under which the board of supervisors does not 
appoint members of the board of directors. Instead, it is the shareholders’ 
meeting that appoints the supervisors.56 Third, while maintaining the board 
of supervisors, China also introduces independent directors and specific board 
sub-committees, which resembles the best practices implemented in the 
United States57 and the United Kingdom.58 
Below, I introduce each major corporate organ inside Chinese 
commercial banks. 
1. Shareholders’ Meeting 
The shareholders’ meeting is the governing body of a Chinese 
company.59 It consists of all shareholders, with each share possessing one 
vote.60 The shareholders’ meeting possesses a number of powers similar to 
their equivalents in other jurisdictions.61 The most important power is to elect 
and dismiss directors and non-employee supervisors.62 Companies may adopt 
the cumulative voting system for the election.63 However, if a listed company 
                                                 
55 See generally Klaus J. Hopt, The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory Board (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 305, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722702 (introducing the laws and practice of 
supervisory boards in Germany). 
56 Company Law, supra note 51, art. 106. 
57 See, e.g., NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL SECTION 303A CORP. GOVERNANCE 
STANDARDS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1–2 (2010), 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/regulation/nyse/final_faq_nyse_listed_company_manual_section_3
03a_updated_1_4_10.pdf. 
58 See, e.g., FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4–5 (2018), 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF.  
59 Company Law, supra note 51, art. 99. 
60 Id. art. 103. 
61 These powers include the power to approve a bank’s operation guidelines and investment plans, the 
reports of the board of directors and the board of supervisors, the annual financial budget plans and final 
accounts, the profit distribution plans and loss recovery plans, the merger, spin-off, dissolution or liquidation, 
and the modification to the articles of association, among others. Id. arts. 37(1), 99. 
62 Id. arts. 37(2), 99. 
63 Id. art. 105. 
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has a controlling shareholder that controls 30% or more of the company’s 
shares, cumulative voting becomes mandatory.64 
2. Board of Directors 
As in other jurisdictions, the board of directors in China has the primary 
responsibility of operating and managing the Chinese commercial banks.65 
Their powers include deciding the operational and investment plans of the 
company; formulating the annual financial budget plans, final accounts, profit 
distribution plans, loss recovery plans, and plans for merger, spin-off, or 
dissolution of the company; deciding on the establishment of internal 
management bodies; and formulating fundamental management systems.66 
Among them, one of the most crucial powers of the board of directors is to 
supervise senior management. It possesses the power to appoint and dismiss 
senior management, to determine their executive compensation, 67  and to 
conduct overall supervision.68 
Banks elect their board members according to the following procedures. 
First, the board’s nomination committee and shareholders, individually or 
jointly holding 3% or more of the voting shares, can nominate candidates to 
the board of directors.69 Second, the board of directors, after deliberation, 
submits the list of candidates to the shareholders’ meeting for an election.70 
Third, the shareholders’ meeting elects the board members on an individual 
                                                 
64 Shangshi gongsi zhili zhun ce (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Comm’n and State Economic and Trade 
Comm’n, Dec. 12, 2013, effective Mar. 1, 2014).   
65 Shangye yinhang gongsi zhili zhiyin (商业银行公司治理指引 ) [Guidance on Corporate 
Governance of Commercial Banks], (promulgated by China Banking Regulatory Comm’n on Printing and 
Distributing the Guidelines for the Admin. of Commercial Banks, July 19, 2013, effective July 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks], 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2013/content_2509243.htm.  
66 Company Law, supra note 51, arts. 46, 108. For commercial banks, the board of directors also 
decides the operational and developmental strategies, the risk tolerance level, risk management, and internal 
control policies, as well as the capital plans and capital management. It also regularly evaluates and improves 
the corporate governance, takes charge of information disclosure, protects the interests of depositors and 
other stakeholders, and establishes mechanisms to address conflicts of interest between the banks and 
shareholders (particularly for major shareholders). Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra 
note 65, art. 19. 
67 Company Law, supra note 51, arts. 46(9), 108 
68 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 19(6). 
69 Id. art. 45(1). 
70 Id. art. 45(2). 
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basis.71 Finally, the elected directors must pass the CBRC’s review.72 The 
term of each elected director is three years.73 
A Chinese commercial bank typically has three categories of board 
members: executive, non-executive, and independent directors. Executive 
directors are directors who also assume other senior management positions in 
the commercial bank.74 Non-executive directors are directors who do not 
assume other management positions.75 Independent directors refer to non-
executive directors who do not have any relationship with the commercial 
bank or its major shareholders76 that may affect his or her independent and 
objective judgment.77 Together, the directors elect the chairperson and vice 
chairperson of the board of directors on a majority basis. 78  The elected 
chairperson cannot be the CEO of the commercial bank.79 
For listed companies, at least one-third of board members must be 
independent directors. 80  They can be nominated by either the board’s 
                                                 
71 Id. art. 45(5). 
72 Id. art. 47(1). 
73 Id. art. 47(2). 
74 Id. art. 21. 
75 Id. 
76 Major shareholder refers to any shareholder holding five percent or more shares of the bank and has 
significant impact on bank decisions. Id. art. 9(2). 
77 Id. art. 21. According to the Guiding Opinions issued by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (“CSRC”), the following persons cannot serve independent directors: 
1. Employees of the company and its affiliates, as well as the direct relatives of these employees (such 
as the spouse, parents, children of the employees) and people having major social relationship with these 
employees (such as the sibling, parents–in–law, children–in–law, spouses of the siblings, siblings of the 
spouse, etc., of the employees); 
2. Natural person shareholders who hold 1% or more of the company’s shares or are one of the top ten 
shareholders of the company, as well as their direct relatives; 
3. Employees of the entity shareholders which hold 5 percent or more of the company’s shares or are 
one of the top five shareholders of the company, as well as their direct relatives; 
4. People who satisfied any of the above three conditions in the recent year; 
5. People who provided services in finance, law, advice, etc. to the company or its affiliate; 
6. Other people provided in the corporate charter; 
7. Other people determined by the CSRC. 
Guanyu zai shangshi gongsi jianli duli dongshi zhidu de zhidao yijian (关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度
的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Independent Director System in Listed Companies] 
(promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission, Aug. 16, 2001), art. 3, 2001 Zhengjianfa 102. 
78 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65 at art. 25. 
79 Id. 
80 Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Independent Director System in Listed Companies, supra 
note 77, art. 1(3). Typically, Chinese commercial banks appoint university professors, retired government 
officials, or private professionals such as lawyers, accountants, or investment bankers to serve as independent 
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nomination committee or shareholders individually or jointly holding 1% or 
more of the voting shares.81 Each independent director cannot serve for more 
than six years.82 In addition, he or she cannot serve as an independent director 
simultaneously in more than two commercial banks.83 Independent directors 
should focus particularly on interested transactions, profit distribution plans, 
employment and dismissal of senior management, matters which could cause 
material losses to the bank, matters which could harm the legitimate interest 
of depositors, minority shareholders, and other stakeholders, and the 
employment of external auditors.84 They must work on their director duties 
for at least fifteen business days in the commercial bank every year.85 
Chinese commercial banks further establish a number of sub-
committees under the board of directors, including for strategy, audit, risk 
management, interested transaction review, nomination, and compensation.86 
Among them, the chairpersons of the audit, interested transaction review, 
nomination, and compensation committees must be independent directors.87 
For listed companies, the majority members of audit, nomination, and 
compensation committees must be independent directors.88 The chairpersons 
of audit, interested transaction review, and risk management committees must 
work for at least twenty-five business days in the commercial bank every 
year.89 
                                                 
directors. These independent directors do not necessarily hold party titles; some of them are even non-Chinese 
professionals. 
81 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 46(1). 
82 In general, this term restriction is considered a good practice because it can prevent independent 
directors from being captured by the management and thus ensures the independence of independent directors. 
Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 47. For a related discussion in the U.S. 
context, see generally Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ Tenure, 68 
HASTINGS L.J. 97 (2016) (discussing whether a tenure restriction is necessary for ensuring the independence 
of independent directors in the United States). 
83 In general, this part-time restriction is considered a good practice because it can prevent independent 
directors from being distracted by overwhelming works and thus ensures the devotion of independent 
directors to the bank. Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 50. For a related 
discussion in the U.S. context, see generally Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could 
Cause the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 87 (2018) (discussing whether to limit the outside 
commitments of independent directors in the United States). 
84 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 54. 
85 Id. art. 55.1. 
86 Id. art. 22. 
87 Id. art. 24.3. 
88 Guiding Principles on Governance of Listed Companies, supra note 64, art. 52. 
89 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 55. 
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3. Board of Supervisors 
In China, the board of supervisors undertakes the primary responsibility 
of internal supervision.90 It possesses the power to inspect financial issues, 
supervise and file actions against the directors and senior management, and 
attend meetings of the board of directors as non-voting participants.91 They 
can propose to dismiss directors or senior management who violate laws, 
regulations, articles of association, or shareholders’ resolutions,92 but they 
cannot elect board members or senior management. 
In a Chinese commercial bank, the board of supervisors consists of 
three categories of members: employee, outside, and shareholder supervisors. 
Employee supervisors are elected by employee representatives, while the 
latter two are elected by the shareholders’ meeting.93 At least one-third of 
supervisors must be employee supervisors.94 For outside supervisors, similar 
to independent directors, they cannot possess relationships that could affect 
their independent judgment with regards to the commercial bank and its major 
shareholders. 95  The term of each supervisor is three years, but outside 
supervisors cannot serve for more than six years.96 Outside and shareholder 
supervisors must work for at least fifteen business days in the commercial 
bank every year.97 
4. Senior Management 
The senior management of a Chinese commercial bank includes the 
CEO, vice presidents, chief financial officer (“CFO”), and the board secretary 
in the case of listed companies. 98  The board of directors appoints the 
                                                 
90 Id. art. 32. 
91 Company Law, supra note 51, arts. 53, 54, 118(1). Commercial banks also have to regularly evaluate 
the board of director’s development strategy, to inspect the operational decision, risk management, and 
internal control of the bank, to supervise the appointment process of directors, to evaluate the performance 
of directors, supervisors, and senior management, to supervise the salary and executive compensation system 
of the bank, and to regularly communicate with the CBRC about the bank’s situation. Guidance on Corp. 
Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 32. 
92 Company Law, supra note 51, arts. 53(2), 118(1). 
93 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 33. 
94 Company Law, supra note 51, art. 117. 
95 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 33(2). 
96 Id. art. 60. 
97 Id. art. 62(2). 
98 Id. art. 39; Company Law, supra note 51, art. 216(1). 
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members of senior management, subject to the CBRC’s review.99 Together, 
the senior managers manage the operational affairs of commercial banks in 
accordance with the articles of association and the board of directors’ 
authorization.100 They are accountable to the board of directors and subject to 
the board of supervisors’ supervision.101 
The CEO leads the senior management. He or she possesses the power 
to direct management of production and business operations, to organize the 
implementation of the board of directors’ resolution, annual operation plans 
and investment plans, to propose to employ or dismiss the vice presidents or 
CFO, and to decide the employment or dismissal of other management.102 
5. The Party Committee 
In addition to the above corporate organs, almost all commercial banks 
have established a unique organ—that is, the party committee.103 The party 
committee is representative of Chinese-style corporate governance,104 but it 
can be rather mysterious for outsiders. For instance, the financial statements 
or official websites of Chinese commercial banks rarely mention the existence 
of a party committee or report the committee’s members.  
The existence of party committees, however, has become more visible 
since 2017. As part of the efforts of the Xi Administration to improve the 
efficiency and productivity of Chinese SOEs by extending the party’s 
                                                 
99 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 65. The CBRC scrutinizes the 
eligibility of the appointed senior management in accordance with the Regulation Administrating the 
Eligibility of Board (Council) Members and Senior Management of Banking Financial Institutions. 
According to this regulation, the scrutiny conducted by the CBRC resembles the fit and proper test adopted 
elsewhere in the world which examines the basic eligibility instead of the merits of the appointed bank 
managers. Therefore, in most of the cases, the CBRC will defer to the bank as long as the appointed bank 
managers do not meet any of the events of disqualification. Yinhang ye jinrong jigou dongsi (lishi) he gaoji 
guanli renyuan renzhi zege guanli banfa (银行业金融机构董事（理事）和高级管理人员任职资格管理办
法) [Regulation Administrating the Eligibility of Board (Council) Members and Senior Management of 
Banking Financial Institutions] (promulgated by China Banking Regulatory Commission, Nov. 18, 2013, 
effective Dec. 18, 2013), CLI.4.213557(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
100 Id. art. 40. 
101 Id. 
102 Company Law, supra note 51, arts. 49, 113. 
103 According to the Company Law, companies shall provide conditions necessary to support the party 
activities in the company. Id. art. 19. 
104 See generally Xiao Li, Legal and Economic Development with Sui Generis Chinese Characteristics: 
A Systems Theorist’s Perspective, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 159, 181–99 (2014) (discussing the Chinese 
characteristics of corporate governance and the party-state’s role therein). 
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representation and leadership in these SOEs,105 in 2017, a number of Chinese 
SOEs, including some Chinese commercial banks, wrote the party committee 
into their articles of incorporation. Among the five SOCBs, four of them, 
namely, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”), 106  the 
Agricultural Bank of China (“ABC”),107 the Bank of China (“BOC”),108 and 
the Bank of Communications (“BoCom”),109 have amended their articles of 
incorporation and institutionalized the party committee therein. Such practice 
has also started to spread to joint-stock commercial banks (“JSCBs”), the 
second-tier banks in China. For instance, the Board of Directors of the China 
Everbright Bank has similarly amended the articles of incorporation and 
submitted them to the shareholders’ approval. 110  According to these 
amendments, the bank shall establish a party organization, that is, the party 
committee.111 This party committee is, in general, comprised of a secretary, 
two deputy secretaries, and a number of party committee members. 112  It 
possesses a number of powers;113 most prominently, the board of directors 
                                                 
105 See Hughes, supra note 39; see also Tom Mitchell, China’s Communist Party Seeks Company 
Control Before Reform, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/31407684-8101-11e7-a4ce-
15b2513cb3ff. 
106 Zhongguo yinjianhui [China Banking Regulatory Commission Reply], Sept. 25, 2017, No. 308. 
107 Zhongguo yinjianhui [China Banking Regulatory Commission Reply], Nov. 8, 2017, No. 349. 
108 Zhongguo yinjianhui [China Banking Regulatory Commission Reply], Nov. 27, 2017, No. 367. 
109 Bank of Communications, Materials for the First Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting of 2017 2–
3, 6–7, 12–14, 22, Oct. 27, 2017 (unpublished shareholder information on file with author) (subject to the 
CBRC’s approval). 
110 China Everbright Bank, Announcement related to the Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation 
of the China Everbright Bank 2–3, Nov. 1, 2017 (unpublished shareholder information on file with author). 
111 See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LIMITED, ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION art. 
13 (Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter ICBC’S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION], 
http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2017/gszc_en.pdf (“The CCP’s organization 
is to be established in accordance with the relevant provisions of the CCP Charter and the Company Act. The 
Party Committee shall play the core leadership function, controlling the direction, managing the overall 
situation, and ensuring the implementation. The Party’s working entities are to be established, equipped with 
an adequate number of party affairs working staff and ensured the working expense of party organizations.”) 
112 Id. art. 52 (“This Bank establishes the CCP’s ICBC Committee [hereinafter the Party Committee]. 
The Party Committee establishes one secretary, two deputy secretaries, and a number of party committee 
members. A single person assumes both the chairperson and the party committee secretary and determines a 
party committee deputy secretary to assist him/her in the party affairs. Party committee members who satisfy 
the related conditions may serve the members of the board of directors, the board of supervisors, or the senior 
management in accordance with legal procedures, while directors, supervisors, or senior managers who 
satisfy the related conditions can join the Party Committee in accordance with related rules and procedures. 
The discipline committee is established in accordance with rules.”) 
113 Id. art. 53 (“The Party Committee exercises the following powers in accordance with CCP Charter 
and other party rules: (1) Promise to supervise the implementation and enforcement of the Party’s and the 
State’s policies in the Bank and implement the major strategic decisions of the Party center and the State 
Council as well as the related important working deployments of the superior party organization; (2) 
Strengthen the leadership and control of the appointment and employment, administer the standard, procedure, 
review, recommendation, and supervision, insist on the principle of party administration of cadres, combined 
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shall consult the party committee’s opinion before deciding on the bank’s 
major issues.114 The emergence of these amendments shocked outsiders who 
were unfamiliar with the party system in Chinese companies.115 
These amendments are, however, less earthshaking than they appear. 
Party committees, as mandated by the CCP Charter, existed far before Chinese 
SOEs amended their articles of incorporation. These amendments simply 
reaffirm and formalize the long-existing practice. In fact, they even fail to lay 
out the essential role of party committees. Below, I introduce the party 
committee in the context of Chinese commercial banks. Chart 2 illustrates the 
party system inside China’s commercial banks. 
Chart 2: Structure of Party Committees 
 
Note: The solid line indicates the power to appoint the arrowed subject. 
The dotted line indicates the obligation to report to the arrowed subject. 
                                                 
with the Board of Directors’ legal power to appoint the management and the management’s legal power to 
employ employees; (3) Study and deliberate the major issues related to the Bank’s steady reform and 
development, major operational affairs, and employees close interests and propose suggestions. Support the 
shareholders’ meeting, the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors, and the Senior Management to 
perform their duties. Support the Employee Representatives’ Meeting to develop their works. (4) Undertake 
the duty to govern the party in a comprehensively strict manner. Lead the political works of the Bank’s 
thinking, the unification works, the spirit and civilization construction, the enterprise’s cultural works, and 
the group works of unions and Communist Youth League. Lead the construction of party style ethics and 
support the discipline committee members to perform the duty to monitor. (5) Strengthen the Bank’s basic 
party organization and the team construction of party members. Sufficiently play the role of the Party sub–
division’s fort and party members’ model. Consolidate and lead cadres and employees to devote to the Bank’s 
reform and development. (6) Other important matters related to the duty of the Party Committee.”) 
114 Id. art. 144. 
115 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 105. Recently, the CSRC is even considering requiring all publicly 
listed companies, including foreign companies and foreign joint ventures, to establish party organizations. 
See Annie Wu, China Requires All Publicly Listed Companies to Establish Communist Party Branches, 
EPOCH TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-requires-all-publicly-listed-
companies-to-establish-communist-party-branches_2565214.html. 
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It is essentially mandatory for each Chinese commercial bank to 
establish a party committee, regardless of whether it amends its articles of 
incorporation or not. This is because, pursuant to the CCP Charter, any 
enterprise that contains three or more official CCP members shall establish a 
primary-level organization of the party, that is, the party committee.116 The 
party members’ meeting elects party committee members117 for a term of 
three to five years.118 After the party committee elects its secretary and deputy 
secretaries, it shall report the election result to its superior party organization 
for approval. 119  In addition to the party committee, an enterprise also 
establishes the party discipline inspection committee (or a single discipline 
inspector) to conduct discipline inspections.120 This committee or inspector 
is led by both the enterprise’s party committee and the superior party 
discipline inspection committee.121 
The primary mission of a party committee is to supervise the 
implementation of the party’s and the state’s policies in that enterprise.122 
Specifically, the party committee undertakes the duty to advertise and execute 
the party’s policies and resolutions; to organize party members to learn 
Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping theories; to educate, 
administer, supervise, and serve party members; to communicate with the 
ordinary people; to discover, develop, and recommend talented party members; 
and to supervise the party cadres and others so that they abide by the state 
laws and discipline.123 In relation to the enterprise’s production and operation, 
it assists the shareholders’ meeting, the board of directors, the board of 
supervisors, and the CEO in exercising their powers in accordance with laws, 
assist the employee representatives’ meeting in developing its work, and 
participate in the decision-making process for the enterprise’s major issues.124 
The primary mission of the party discipline inspection committee (or 
the discipline inspector) is to safeguard the CCP Charter and other party 
                                                 
116 XIANFA (中国共产党章程), art. 30 (2012) (China). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. art. 31. 
119 Id. art. 31. 
120 Id. art. 45. 
121 Id. This superior party discipline inspection committee could be at the central level or local level of 
the CPP, and its committee members are elected by the party member’s meeting of that party organization. 
122 Id. art. 33. 
123 Id. art. 32. 
124 Id. art. 33. 
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bylaws, to inspect the enforcement of party policies and resolutions, to assist 
the party committee in developing the party’s spirit, and to organize and 
coordinate anti-corruption works. 125  To ensure the compliance of party 
disciplines, the party discipline inspection committee should frequently 
educate party members to abide by the party discipline, monitor the cadres’ 
exercise of power, inspect and handle breaches of party charter or bylaws 
made by party organizations or party members, and decide the punishment 
against the party members, etc.126 Its inspection, however, is subject to review 
from the superior discipline inspection committee.127 
6. Summary of the Statutory Governance Systems of 
Chinese Commercial Banks 
Chart 3 summarizes the governance system of a Chinese commercial 
bank as follows: 
Chart 3: Corporate Governance System of Chinese Commercial Banks by Statute 
 
                                                 
125 Id. art. 44. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. art. 45. 
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To illustrate, in law, the governance system of a Chinese commercial 
bank can be divided into two parts: the corporate system and the party system. 
The corporate system deals with corporate affairs, including operational 
affairs and supervisory affairs. For operational affairs, the board of directors 
takes the charge, supported by the senior management. For supervisory affairs, 
the board of supervisors takes the charge. In general, all these corporate organs 
are accountable to shareholders. On the other hand, since a commercial bank 
contains party members, it also involves party and party discipline issues and 
thus needs the party system to deal with those issues. The party committee 
and its party discipline inspection committee are responsible for party and 
party discipline issues.  
There are three points to note about the governance system of Chinese 
commercial banks. First, legally speaking, the party committee does not 
decide on the corporate affairs of a commercial bank. Its responsibility focuses 
primarily on party affairs, such as party promotion, party education, and party 
discipline inspection. As for corporate affairs, the party committee plays 
mainly a consultative or supportive role. Undeniably, there may be some gray 
areas between corporate affairs and party affairs, especially after a number of 
Chinese commercial banks amended their articles of incorporation and 
required their boards of directors to consult the party committee’s opinion 
before deciding on major corporate affairs.128 That said, the party committee 
is at most an advisor instead of a decision maker on the corporate affairs of a 
commercial bank. 
Second, within the corporate system, legally speaking, the board of 
directors undertakes the primary role. It takes charge of operational affairs, 
leads the senior management in implementing operational decisions, and 
manages the risk, capital, and internal control of commercial banks. It 
appoints, dismisses, and rewards senior management, thereby obtaining the 
power to supervise senior management. In line with the best practices 
proposed by the Basel Committee,129 the board of directors plays a central 
role in the corporate governance of Chinese commercial banks. 
Third, the role of the board of supervisors is rather weak. Although it is 
responsible for the supervisory affairs, it shares this task with the board of 
director’s sub-committees, such as audits, nominations, interested transaction 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., ICBC’S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 111, art. 144. 
129 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
FOR BANKS, principle 1 (2015), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.pdf. 
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control, and others. In some sense, the board of supervisors plays merely a 
supplementary role to these sub-committees. The primary responsibility left 
to the board of supervisors is the duty to evaluate the performance of directors, 
supervisors, and senior management.130 To the extent that Chinese laws are 
gradually shifting the power of the board of supervisors to the board of 
directors and highlighting the importance of independent directors and board 
sub-committees, the corporate governance of Chinese commercial banks is 
converging toward the Anglo-Saxon model.131 
B. Governance on the Street 
Unsurprisingly, the real practice implemented in Chinese commercial 
banks deviates from the aforementioned statutory designs. The CCP’s 
dominant position in China’s economy and society blurs the clear statutory 
distinction between the corporate and party system. In place of the board of 
directors, the party committee, which is relatively weak according to the 
statutory design, moves to the power center. The board of directors, which is 
the statutory power center, only has marginal power in real life.  
Chart 4 describes the real situation in Chinese commercial banks. In 
practice, three main characteristics of Chinese-style bank governance stand 
out. First, the power center of the bank is reversed from the board of directors 
to the executive team, i.e. the party committee. Second, the party system 
captures the power center. Third, the majority shareholder of a bank does not 
necessarily possess the control over the bank. Behind them stands the 
omnipresent Chinese party-state. 
  
                                                 
130 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 32. 
131 This echoes the observation of Hansmann and Kraakman. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, Reflections on The End of History for Corporate Law, in CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: PROMISE AND PROSPECTS 32 (Abdul Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012) (observing that 
the world company laws, including that in China, is converging toward the shareholder-oriented model as 
practiced in the United States and the United Kingdom). 
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Chart 4: Real Governance Practice of Chinese Commercial Banks 
 
Note: The solid line indicates the de facto power to appoint the arrowed subject. 
The dotted line indicates the de facto obligation to report to the arrowed subject. 
1. The Reverse of the Power Center to the Party Committee 
The real power center of a company often rests with the executive team, 
not the board of directors. Even though the company laws of almost all 
jurisdictions vest the supreme operational power to the board of directors, the 
reality is that the board of directors largely delegates this power to the 
executives, in particular, the power to handle daily operational affairs. The 
limited number of board meetings held annually is telling. In China, listed 
commercial banks convene around ten board meetings annually. 132  Most 
directors, with the exception of the executive directors and some special non-
executive directors, only work on a part-time basis.133 In light of the limited 
time devoted to the bank, the board of directors, at most, decides the major 
operational issues. It does not manage the operation of the bank on a day-to-
day basis. 
Similar to other jurisdictions, the corporate organ in charge of the daily 
operation of a Chinese commercial bank is the executive team. In China, this 
                                                 
132 Looking at the five largest Chinese Commercial Banks in 2016: ICBC convened eight board of 
director meetings, CCB convened seven, ABC convened fourteen, BOC convened eleven, and BoCom 
convened eight.  
133 The Guidance on Corporate Governance of Commercial Banks hints that independent directors of 
commercial banks are only expected to work for fifteen to twenty–five business days a year at the bank. See 
Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 55. 
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executive team generally includes the board chairperson, the supervisory 
board chairperson, the CEO, other executive directors, vice presidents, and 
other senior managers. In law, the board of directors possesses the power to 
design operational policies for the bank, delegate the implementation to the 
executive team, hear reports from the executive team on the implementation, 
and monitor the performance of the executive team.134 In practice, as the 
board of directors can only devote limited time, it is the executive team that 
drafts the operational policies and plans for the board of directors’ approval. 
It is this team that really manages and makes most of the operational decisions 
for the bank. The board of directors plays at most an advisory or monitoring 
role.  
To be fair, the above practice is not exclusive to China.135 The special 
practice in China, however, is that the party-state captures the executive team. 
In Chinese commercial banks, most members of the executive team are often 
simultaneously the members of the bank’s party committee. The board’s 
chairperson is often the party committee’s secretary,136 the CEO is often the 
party committee’s deputy secretary, and the supervisory board’s chairperson 
and other vice presidents are often party committee members.137 For instance, 
take the Industrial Bank, the sixth largest commercial bank in China in 2016, 
the secretary of the bank’s party committee was the bank’s chairperson Gao 
Jianping,138 while other party committee members included the CEO Tao 
Yiping, the chairperson of the supervisory board Jiang Yunming, and the vice 
presidents Chen Jinguang, Xue Hefeng, Chen Xinjian, Li Weimin, and Sun 
Xiongpeng.139 
In appearance, this arrangement reduces the conflict between the party 
system and the corporate system. As mentioned above, sometimes the division 
between corporate affairs and party affairs can be ambiguous, which leads to 
an unclear division of works between the corporate system and the party 
system. By delegating both the corporate works and party works to the same 
                                                 
134 Id. arts. 19(1), 40, 41. 
135 It is a universal practice in other jurisdictions such as the United States. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, 
Process over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S.C. L. 
REV. 261, 269–74 (2012). 
136 An increasing number of banks have institutionalized this practice by amending their articles of 
incorporation which mandate that the chairperson and the party committee’s secretary shall be assumed by 
the same person. See, e.g., ICBC’S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, supra note 111, art. 52. 
137 See Howson, supra note 23, at 142–43; STENT, supra note 23, at 49. 
138 INDUSTRIAL BANK, XINGYE YINHANG GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI 2016 NIAN NIANDU BAOGAO (兴业银
行股份有限公司 2016年年度报告) [ANNUAL REPORT OF 2016] 91 (2017). 
139 Id. at 91–96. 
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group of people, i.e., the executive team (or the party committee), this 
arrangement streamlines the decision process inside commercial banks. By 
virtue of this arrangement, the CCP can also nominally preserve its ideology 
that the party must penetrate in every economic unit while avoiding 
jeopardizing the decisional efficiency of commercial banks. 
In this context, an entity’s control over the board of directors of a 
commercial bank does not infer control over that commercial bank per se. It 
is the control over the executive team (or the party committee) that counts. 
2. The Party System’s Capture of the Power Center 
In most companies with concentrated ownership, whether the power 
center rests on the executive team or the board of directors is not a significant 
problem because, in either case, the control ultimately rests on the controlling 
shareholders. This is because the shareholders’ meeting possesses the power 
to appoint directors, while the board of directors, in turn, possesses the power 
to appoint and dismiss the executive team and determine their compensation. 
Under this setting, a controlling shareholder naturally dominates the board of 
directors and thus dominates the executive team and the company. In other 
words, the controlling shareholder’s control over the board of directors 
generally equates with its control over the executive team and the company.  
As illustrated above, China adopts the same rule in its corporate laws 
as well. The practice, however, does not work as planned, thanks again to the 
unique party-state system in China. The crucial difference between China’s 
system and other jurisdictions is that China de facto assigns the power to 
appoint and dismiss the executive team to the party system, not the board of 
directors. The Company Law indeed assigns this power to the board of 
directors.140 In Chinese commercial banks, however, as illustrated above, 
members of the executive team wear two hats: the executive hat under the 
corporate system and the party committee hat under the party system. 
Accordingly, in addition to the Company Law, CCP’s Charter also applies to 
the appointment, dismissal, reward, and promotion of these members. In 
addition, the party system often exercises the de facto power to appoint, 
dismiss, and reward the executive team, i.e., the party committee. 
 
                                                 
140 Company Law, supra note 51, art. 113. 
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a. The Power to Appoint 
In practice, the appointment process adopted by the party system differs 
from the design provided in the CCP’s Charter.141 According to the CCP’s 
Charter, all party members in the commercial bank elect the party committee 
members through the party members’ meeting. In practice, however, the 
superior party system, in particular, the organizational department of the 
superior party system, appoints the party committee members. To illustrate in 
detail, for the five SOCBs, which are institutions at the central level, the 
Central Organization Department appoints their executives. 142  For city 
commercial banks (“CCBs”) and rural commercial banks (“RCBs”), which 
are institutions at local levels, the organization departments of the local party 
system that the bank belongs to appoint most of their executives.143 JSCBs, 
the second-tier national banks in China, are relatively tricky. For local banks 
(e.g., Shanghai Pudong, Industrial, Zheshang, Bohai), the appointment power 
rests on the organization departments of that local party system.144 For others 
that are part of a central SOE business group (e.g., CITIC), the appointment 
power rests on the party system within that SOE.145 In some tricky cases, in 
particular the Merchant Bank and China Minsheng Bank, the appointment 
power rests with the CBRC.146 
To be fair, the party system does not completely ignore the appointment 
rules of related corporate laws. To harmonize these corporate laws with the 
party regime, the CCP at least “formally” complies with these laws. For 
instance, in the case of a CEO, when there is an open seat the selection process 
does not start from the board of directors or the nomination committee of the 
commercial bank. Instead, the party system takes charge. It selects potential 
candidates from its database of human resources, which extends to not only 
the senior managers of the bank itself, but also those from other banks or even 
officials of the governmental branches. Once it reaches a decision, it notifies 
corresponding corporate organs of the commercial bank to perform the 
                                                 
141 See STENT, supra note 23, at 47. 
142 LIU PENG (刘鹏), ZHONGGUO SHANGYE YINHANG BIANGE YU ZHUANXING: JINJI SHICHANGHUA 
ZHONG SHANGYE YIHANG DE ZUOYONG YU KE CHIXU FAJAN (中国商业银行变革与转型：经济市场化中商
业银行的作用与可持续发展) [THE REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS: THE 
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appointment process required by corporate laws, such as the nomination 
committee’s meeting and the board of directors’ meeting. Candidates 
“recommended” by the party system are almost always approved. In this way, 
the appointment process of this CEO formally complies with all the 
procedural requirements mandated by corporate laws. In reality, however, 
these corporate organs do not make the appointment decision; the party 
system does. 
b. The Power to Dismiss 
The party system also possesses the power to dismiss bank executives 
as needed. Dismissals can involve corruption, scandals, breach of party 
discipline, or simply poor management.147 To harmonize with corporate rules, 
in practice the party system rarely orders a dismissal. Instead, it would have 
the executive resign from his or her post. In this way, the party system can 
refrain from formally infringing the dismissal power of the board of directors. 
Since General Secretary Xi strengthened the crackdown on corruption 
and discipline violations in recent years, the party system has sent an 
increasing number of bank executives to the discipline investigation. Between 
August 2014 and July 2015, it put more than fifteen bank vice presidents or 
senior executives under the discipline investigation, including the former 
CEO of China Minsheng Bank, the former vice president of Huaxia Bank, the 
former chairperson of China Guangfa Bank, and the former chairperson of 
Bank of Chengdu.148 The most high-profile case in recent years took place in 
November 2015, which involved the CEO of ABC, Zhang Yun. Before the 
conclusion of the investigation, the party had already demoted his party 
ranking.149 In December, he also resigned from all his positions in ABC. 
                                                 
147 STENT, supra note 23, at 51. 
148 Li Yumin (李玉敏) & Zhang Jie (张杰), Yi niannei yinhang ye chao bairen yina tan fu luoma zhihang 
zhang zhan bi wu cheng (一年内银行业超百人因贪腐落马 支行长占比五成) [More Than A Hundred of 
People in the Banking Industry Went Down in One Year due to Corruption, The Head of Sub-branches Took 
Fifty Percent of Them], 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (21世纪经济报道), Aug. 2, 2015. 
149 Li Weiau (李微敖), Nong hang hang zhangzhang yun jiangji ceng zao yuan fu xing zhang yanghun 
dang ting jubao (農行行長張雲降級 曾遭原副行長楊琨當庭舉報) [The CEO of ABC, Zhang Yun, Was 
Demoted, He Used to be Reported by the Former Vice President Yang Kun on Trial], SOUTHERN WKLY. (南
方周末), Nov. 2, 2015. 
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c. The Power to Reward and Promote 
The party system often promotes bank executives to a higher or more 
glamorous position within its system as a way to reward their performance 
and incentivize their cooperation. This includes intra-bank promotion, inter-
bank promotion—sometimes referred to as parachuting—or even bank-to-
government promotion. Sometimes a party system might find an empty post 
which could be anywhere: in a commercial bank, a non-bank financial 
institution, or even a government branch. If it finds a bank executive the best 
candidate for that post, it could have him or her resign from his or her current 
bank and promote him or her to that empty post. In this case, sometimes the 
bank would disclose that the departure of specific top executive results from 
“job transfer.” 
Both intra-bank and inter-bank promotions are frequent in recent years. 
The recent change of ICBC’s chairperson and CEO is illustrative of intra-bank 
promotions. In 2016, the former ICBC chairperson Jiang Jianqing retired from 
his post; since then, the Central Organization Department of the CCP 
conducted an on-site meeting and study in ICBC.150 In May 2016, it decided 
to promote ICBC’s then-CEO Yi Huiman to the post of chairperson and 
secretary of the party committee.151 As this promotion left the post of CEO 
empty, the Central Organization Department in September 2016 decided to 
promote the ICBC’s then-vice president Gu Shu to the post of CEO.152 The 
recent change of ABC’s chairperson serves a good example of an inter-bank 
promotion. In December 2015, ABC’s former CEO Zhang Yun resigned from 
his post due to the accusation of corruption; after that, the Central 
Organization Department of the CCP decided to promote Zhao Huan, the CEO 
                                                 
150 Wan Min (万敏), Zhong zu bu renming yihui man wei gongxing dangwei shuji jiang jiren dougshi 
zhang (中组部任命易会满为工行党委书记 将接任董事长) [The Central Organization Department 
Appoint Yi Huiman as the Party Committee Secretary of ICBC, Will Assume the Chairperson], NAT’L BUS. 
DAILY (每日经济新闻), May 16, 2016. 
151 Id. 
152 Zhang Wei (张威), Shengeng gongxing shiba nian gu shu jieren xin yiren xing zhang (深耕工行十
八年 谷澍接任新一任行长) [Working Hard in ICBC for Eighteen Years, Gu Shu Will Become the Next 
CEO], CAIJING (财经), Sept. 12, 2016. 
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of Everbright Bank, from a JSCB to an SOCB to fill this post.153 Other high-
profile promotions in recent years include the promotion of ABC’s 
Chairperson Liu Shiyu to serve as CSRC’s chairperson, the promotion of 
ICBC’s vice president Zheng Wanchun to serve as China Minsheng Bank’s 
CEO, and the promotion of BOC’s vice president Zhu Hexin to serve as the 
deputy provincial governor of Sichuan Province. 
* * * 
Without the personnel powers articulated above, the monitoring 
function of the board of directors, if any, is weak. The board of directors of 
Chinese commercial banks can still conduct audits, review the interested 
transaction, and supervise internal control.154  Nevertheless, it has limited 
teeth to enforce these actions against bank executives. Moreover, it has to 
share some of these powers with the party system. For instance, the party 
system also controls the party discipline inspection committee in each 
commercial bank, which inspects the legal compliance and interested 
transactions of bank executives. Backed by the CCP’s discipline system, the 
party discipline inspection committee possesses even sharper teeth to enforce 
the discipline inspection. Accordingly, the function of the board of directors 
in Chinese commercial banks is supervisory in statute but advisory in nature: 
it can supervise bank executives in certain aspects, but since it has limited 
tools to enforce its supervision, its supervision is more like advice to the real 
supervisor, i.e., the party system. 
The executive team is further capable of influencing the appointment 
of board members. As mentioned above, the board member candidates are 
selected by the nomination committee and then recommended by the board of 
directors to the shareholders for their approval. In practice, however, the 
executive team captures the selection process. This is particularly the case for 
                                                 
153 Li Weiau (李微敖), Guang dayuan xing zhang zhougguo nongxing qianren bei jiangji (光大原行
长赵欢掌中国农行 前任被降级后辞职) [The Former CEO of Everbright, Zhao Huan, Manage the ABC, 
The Former Resigned after Demoted], SOUTHERN WKLY. (南方周末), Jan. 15, 2016. 
154 It is also reported that the board of directors is allowed to veto the proposals made by the executive 
team, i.e. the party committee. Howson, supra note 23, at 140–41. 
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the selection of independent directors.155 After the executive team, backed by 
the party system, selects the directorate candidates, the board of directors and 
shareholders typically have no choice but to accept the nominated candidates. 
In the end, these board meetings and shareholders’ meetings only possess 
nominal election power—the real power rests with the executive team and the 
party system behind it.156 
The board of supervisors is equally weak or even weaker. For instance, 
similar to the board of directors, the executive team/party committee generally 
dominates the selection of supervisor candidates. This compromises the 
independence of the board of supervisors. In addition, except for employee 
supervisors, commercial banks do not have full-time executive supervisors. 
This limits the time and resources available to the board of supervisors for 
effective supervision. Furthermore, many internal audit divisions of 
commercial banks report directly to the CEO, while the board of supervisors 
can only gather necessary information by hearing reports from the executive 
team. 157  Within this setting, an effective system of checks and balances 
against the executive team are largely unavailable. 
3. The Separation of Ownership from Control 
Under this governance practice, shareholders play an extremely 
marginalized role, regardless of whether or not they are the majority, or 
whether or not they are governmental entities. Despite their dominant equity 
ownership and board seats, shareholders do not have real say over the 
personnel or operational decisions of their banks. Even if a shareholder is a 
                                                 
155 See Cheng Xiaoping (程小平), Woguo shangye yinhang donshihui zhili cunzai wenti yu duice (我
国商业银行董事会治理存在问题与对策) [The Problems of and Solutions for the Board Governance in 
China’s Commercial Banks], 30 MODERN BUS. (现代商业) 31, 32 (2013). 
156 To be sure, this approach is similar to that adopted by the U.S. executive-controlled companies for 
influencing the selection of independent directors. See generally Richard Clune et al., The Nominating 
Committee Process: A Qualitative Examination of Board Independence and Formalization, 31 CONTEMP. 
ACCT. RES. 748 (2014) (conducting qualitative studies on to what extent the CEOs of U.S. companies 
intervenes in the decision of nominating committees and to what extent are committee processes formalized); 
For an account of the evolution and status quo of nominating committees in the United States, see generally 
Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: A Decision-Making 
Analysis, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 144–51 (2008) (detailing the process for nominating the board members 
in U.S. companies). 
157 See LIU, supra note 142, at 169–70. 
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state agency and possesses majority shares, it is the party system behind that 
agency that possesses the power, not that agency itself. 
The only privilege left to shareholders is the power to appoint non-
executive directors who are not independent directors, also known as 
“shareholder directors” in China. That said, only shareholders holding 3% or 
more of voting shares can nominate representative directors. 158  In the 
majority of instances, the party system respects the right of major shareholders 
to nominate their directorial candidates and allows them to have those seats 
on the board of directors. Consequently, major shareholders may indirectly 
participate in the direction of the bank’s major policies and share the 
supervisory/advisory function of the board of directors, which more or less 
protects the interest of shareholders. 159  Nonetheless, these shareholder 
directors are far away from the real power center. Most importantly, neither 
these shareholder directors nor major shareholders possess the real power to 
appoint, dismiss, or reward the executive team. Their supervision is 
essentially toothless. 
C. Some Case Studies of the Bank Governance Practice in China 
1. The Big Four and a Half 
Because the SOCBs are the largest type of banks and control 37.3% of 
bank assets in China,160 the CCP maintains the tightest control over these 
banks. Cases of the SOCBs thus best illustrate the “Huijin Model” and how 
the Chinese party-state intervenes in the corporate governance of Chinese 
commercial banks. Table 1 summarizes the ownership structure, board 
composition, and senior management of the five SOCBs. 
  
                                                 
158 Guidance on Corp. Governance of Com. Banks, supra note 65, art. 45(1). 
159 For instance, when deliberating the direction of the bank’s major policies in the board meeting, the 
shareholder directors designated by major shareholders may raise dissidents or even vetoes against the 
proposal made by the executive team. 
160 CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 32, at 27. 
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Table 1: Ownership Structure, Board Composition, and Senior Management of SOCBs 
(2016) 
Name Major Shareholders Board Composition Executive Composition 
ICBC Huijin (34.99%) MOF (34.6%) 
4 executive directors 
5 shareholder directors (3 
Huijin, 2 MOF) 
5 independent directors 




Supervisory Board Chairperson: 
Parachute 
Vice Presidents:  
1 Internally promoted 
4 Parachute 
CCB Huijin (57.31%) 
4 executive directors 
3 shareholder directors (all 
Huijin) 
6 independent directors 




Supervisory Board Chairperson: 
Parachute 
Vice Presidents:  
4 Internally promoted 
1 Parachute 
ABC Huijin (40.03%) MOF (39.21%) 
3 executive directors 
6 shareholder directors (all 
Huijin) 
5 independent directors 




Supervisory Board Chairperson: 
Parachute 
Vice Presidents:  
1 Internally promoted 
3 Parachute 
BOC Huijin (64.63%) 
4 executive directors 
4 shareholder directors (all 
Huijin) 
5 independent directors 




Supervisory Board Chairperson: 
Parachute 
Vice Presidents:  





Social Security Fund 
(14.71%) 
4 executive directors 
8 shareholder directors 
(3MOF, 1 SSF, 2 HSBC, 1 
China Tobacco, 1 Capital 
Airport) 
6 independent directors 




Supervisory Board Chairperson: 
Parachute 
Vice Presidents:  
2 Internally promoted 
2 Parachute 
Note: Italics indicate that the shareholder is a foreign strategic investor. 
From their ownership structure and board composition, one may 
mistakenly perceive that the central government controls these SOCBs. As 
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Table 1 indicates, the central government, through either the Central Huijin or 
the MOF, is the controlling shareholder of all five SOCBs. In the case of Bank 
of Communications (“BoCom”), it also has a private block-holder HSBC, 
which is a foreign strategic investor that holds more than 5% ownership. The 
SOCBs’ board composition, in general, replicates their ownership structure. 
As Table 1 indicates, on the board of directors of each SOCB, executive 
directors occupy only the minimum number of seats, while independent 
directors take slightly more than one-third of seats. The state controlling 
shareholder takes almost all of the remaining seats, leaving only two seats to 
foreign strategic investors in the case of BoCom.161  
That is not the case, however. In practice, although the Central Huijin 
and/or the MOF is the majority shareholder and takes almost all the board 
seats, neither of them controls the personnel power of any of these SOCBs. 
Instead, the power to appoint and dismiss the executives of SOCBs rests on 
the CCP’s central party system, the Central Organization Department.162 For 
instance, when the ICBC’s chairperson and CEO positions were vacant in 
2016, neither the Central Huijin nor the MOF intervened in searching for 
replacements. Rather, the Central Organization Department conducted on-site 
interviews of potential candidates and reached its own decision for the new 
chairperson and CEO. 163  The same happened in the case of ABC as 
mentioned above.164 
The SOCB’s executive composition further reveals the Central 
Organization Department’s frequent intervention in the SOCBs’ personnel 
decisions. As Table 1 summarizes, among the five SOCBs, none of them has 
a majority of executives originating from internal promotions. Only the 
ICBC’s board chairperson and CEO were both internally promoted. The 
executives of other SOCBs, including their board chairpersons and CEOs, 
mostly parachuted from other state banks or governmental agencies. Such a 
high rate of parachutes results from the “invisible” hand behind the scene, i.e., 
                                                 
161 This has suggested the limited role of foreign capital in the corporate governance of SOCBs. See 
Howson, supra note 23, at 137–39. 
162 STENT, supra note 23, at 42. 
163 Wan, supra note 150; Zhang, supra note 152. 
164 Li, supra note 153. 
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the Central Organization Department, which frequently rotates bankers and 
government officials.165 
This party-state-operated governance practice nullifies the very 
purpose of incorporating the Central Huijin. By incorporating the Central 
Huijin to hold the state’s ownership on the state’s behalf, Chinese reformers 
envisaged a state holding company model, which was meant to create a 
business-oriented entity comprised of commercial professionals to sever the 
direct command and order imposed by the government on SOCBs.166 The 
Central Huijin formally adopts this model, but it is a completely different 
picture in substance. Instead of consisting of business professionals, the 
executive team of the Central Huijin remains controlled by political elites.167 
In addition, the Central Huijin can only appoint its representatives to serve as 
non-executive directors of the SOCBs, which in no way transforms into real 
control over the SOCBs’ operations. 
What is left to Central Huijin is some marginal supervisory or advisory 
functions.168 To the extent that it controls a significant number of seats on the 
SOCBs’ board of directors, it possesses the venue to voice its concerns about 
SOCBs’ operation or performance. Statistics show that Central Huijin’s 
shareholder directors raise more dissenting opinions and vetoes than 
independent directors on the SOCBs’ boards of directors,169 which suggests 
that the Central Huijin more or less supplements the monitoring role of 
independent directors. That said, it can at most monitor the personal 
misbehavior of the executive team itself. It can do little if the mismanagement 
results from misdirection from the central party system. 
                                                 
165 The criteria for the Central Organization Department to appraise bank executives should include 
“achievement of growth and profitability goals, avoidance of risk and losses, and implementation of national 
and Party policy guidelines, economic and non-economic, and, of course, adherence to Party discipline.” 
STENT, supra note 23, at 114. 
166 The most famous case adopting this state holding company model is Singapore’s Temasek Holding. 
167 For instance, Central Huijin’s current deputy chairperson Li Jiange had his career mainly in the State 
Council. Two vice presidents had their career in the MOF and CSRC, respectively. Only the CEO, Bai Tao, 
appears to be more business-oriented, who had his career mainly in the ICBC. 
168 See STENT, supra note 23, at 157–58, for a similar observation. 
169 Gao Xiging: hunhe suoyouzhi shi due quoyu zichan jinxing zhiyue (高西庆：混合所有制是对国有
资产进行制约) [Gao Xiqing: Mixed Ownership is to Restrain State–owned Asset], SINA FIN. (新浪財經), 
Nov. 26, 2014. 
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2. China Minsheng Bank 
The case of China Minsheng Bank (“CMB”) best illustrates the 
omnipresence of the party system. It shows how the Chinese party-state 
penetrates a major Chinese commercial bank even though it does not control 
any significant ownership or directorship. 
Unlike most large Chinese commercial banks, CMB is a privately-
owned bank listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. By the end of 2016, its largest shareholder was Anbang Insurance, 
which held 17.84% ownership, followed by the coalition of Orient Group and 
Huaxia Life (5.74%), the China Oceanwide Group (4.61%), New Hope Group 
(4.41%), and Fosun International (2.22%).170 All of these shareholders are 
private companies or institutions. Under this ownership structure, the Chinese 
party-state in no way controlled CMB in appearance. 
CMB’s board composition also seems to be dominated by private 
capital. As of 2016, its board of directors consisted of seventeen directors, 
including three executive directors, nine shareholder directors, and six 
independent directors. 171  The state shareholder did not appoint any 
representatives to the board of directors. Instead, each of the nine shareholder 
directors was affiliated with a private shareholder.172 Furthermore, no single 
shareholder dominated the board of directors. Rather, the seats of shareholder 
directors were distributed equally among the major private shareholders.173 
With this composition, CMB’s board of directors seemed controlled by private 
capital instead of the party-state. 
The Chinese party-state, however, found a different way to penetrate 
CMB’s operation and executive appointments. CMB is a national bank that 
falls within the jurisdiction of the central party system. In the past, the CCP’s 
Central Financial Works Committee (“CFWC”) within the central party 
                                                 
170 CMB, ZHONG GUO MINSHENG YINHANG 2016 NIAN NIANDU BAO GAO (中國民生銀行 2016年年度
報告) [ANNUAL REPORT OF 2016] 75–77 (2017). 
171 Id. at 86–87. 
172 Id. at 90–93. 
173 Id. 
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system took charge of CMB’s personnel decisions.174 After the CFWC was 
dissolved, the CBRC’s party committee took over its main tasks.175 Therefore, 
unlike other banks where the CBRC is merely a regulator that reviews and 
approves the elected executive candidates on an ex-post and fit and proper 
basis, the CBRC engages deeper in the appointment process on an ex-ante and 
merit basis. The CBRC sets the appointment standards at the beginning of the 
appointment process and asks the board of directors to abide by its standards 
when selecting potential candidates.176 It further recommends the candidate 
it prefers to CMB’s board of directors and asks CMB to appoint the CBRC’s 
candidate. In this way, the CBRC dominates the executive appointment 
process of CMB.177  
The appointment of CMB’s current CEO Zheng Wanchun best 
illustrates the CBRC’s dominance. In January 2015, after the CCP started to 
investigate CMB’s former CEO Mao Xiaofeng for his breach of discipline, 
the CBRC dismissed him from his position as CMB’s CEO and party 
committee secretary.178 This left the post of CMB’s CEO vacant. To search 
for the new CEO, a major shareholder, who was also a former shareholder 
director, publicly recommended that CMB should select candidates through 
public recruitment. 179  The CBRC, however, did not adopt this 
recommendation. Instead, it conducted its selection process secretly.180 Since 
Zheng was the vice president of ICBC at that time, the CBRC also privately 
                                                 
174 Zhongguo minsheng yinhang qian dangwei fu shuji linkeping; cong wu dao you (中国民生银行前
党委副书记林克平：从无到有) [CMB’s Former Party Committee Vice Secretary Lin Keping: From Nothing 
to Something], QQ FIN. (騰訊財經), Jan. 11, 2016.  
175 For an introduction of the CFWC, see Sebastian Heilmann, Regulatory Innovation by Leninist 
Means: Communist Party Supervision in China’s Financial Industry, 181 CHINA Q. 1, 17–18 (2005). 
176 Merchant Bank also does this when it selects its CEO. Li Weiau (李微敖), Zhaoshang yinhang 
dongshihui de 18 zhang yizi (招商银行董事会的 18张椅子) [The Eighteen Chairs of the Merchant Bank’s 
Board of Directors], SOUTHERN WKLY. (南方周末), June 14, 2013. 
177 Ge Jia (葛佳), Minsheng yinhang xing zhang yi zili kong xuan bannian hou gongxing fu xingzhang 
zhengwanchun keneng kongjiang buque (民生银行行长一职空悬半年后，工行副行长郑万春可能空降补
缺) [Half–year After the Vacancy of China Minsheng Bank’s CEO, Zheng Wanchun, the Vice President of 
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consulted ICBC’s opinion.181 In October 2015, ICBC announced Zheng’s 
resignation from his post in ICBC.182 In November 2015, CMB’s board of 
directors approved the appointment of Zheng as its new CEO.183  
This case illustrates how powerless private capital is in appointing the 
bank’s CEO, despite their absolute control of the majority of the board of 
directors. It also represents the epitome of the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-
Dragon practice that is prevalent among Chinese commercial banks. The 
Dragon, the party system, hides its dominance over the Great Wall Street well, 
while Tigers, private capital, can only crouch. 
III. EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE OF CHINESE COMMERCIAL BANKS 
Corporate governance is not only about the internal governance 
structure of a firm; it also concerns other external governance mechanisms 
such as market competition, governmental regulation, or hostile takeovers.184 
In addition, empirical studies have shown that some external governance 
mechanisms, such as robust market competition, advanced financial 
development, or transparent political institutions, may control the negatives 
of state ownership and improve the performance of state-owned banks.185 
Accordingly, although the Chinese party-state dominates the internal 
                                                 
181 Zheng Wanchun ciren gongxing fu xing zhang xiaoxi cheng jiang danzen minsheng yinhang xing 
zhang (郑万春辞任工行副行长 消息称将担任民生银行行长) [Zheng Wanchun Resigned ICBC’s Vice 
President, Information Says He will Assume the CEO of CMB], SOHU BUS. (搜狐财经), Oct. 22, 2015. 
182 Id. 
183 Song Yikang (宋易康), Gong xing yuan fu xing zhang Zhang Wanchun jian chuzen minsheng 
yinhang xeng zhang jiyu yu tiao zhan bingcun (工行原副行长郑万春将出任民生银行行长 机遇与挑战并
存) [ICBC’s Former Vice President Zheng Wanchun Will Assume CMB’s CEO, Opportunity and Challenge 
Both Exist], CHINA BUS. NEWS (一财网), Nov. 20, 2015. 
184 See generally Mark Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) (theorizing the institutions 
that can facilitate the corporate governance of firms, including internal and external institutions). 
185 See generally, e.g., Tobias Korner & Isabel Schnabel, Public Ownership of Banks and Economic 
Growth: The Impact of Country Heterogeneity, 19 ECON. TRANSITION 407 (2011) (finding that government 
ownership of banks is harmful to a country’s financial and economic development only if a country has low 
financial development and low institutional quality); Svetlana Andrianova et al., Government Ownership of 
Banks, Institutions and Economic Growth, 79 ECONOMIA 449 (2012) (finding that government ownership of 
banks is actually positively correlated with the long-run growth rate of a country); Marcia Million Cornett et 
al., The Impact of State Ownership on Performance Differences in Privately-owned versus State-owned 
Banks: An International Comparison, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 74 (2010) (studying the Asian Financial 
Crisis and finding that state-owned banks closed the gap with private banks in terms of cash flow returns, 
core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004). 
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governance of Chinese commercial banks, as long as China maintains other 
robust external governance institutions, it does not necessarily follow that 
these Chinese banks will perform poorly.186 In this section, I explore the 
status of external governance on the Great Wall Street. 
A. Growing Yet Distorted Market Competition 
Market competition, specifically competition in the product market and 
the capital market, may incentivize corporate management to improve 
operational efficiency. 
1. Oligopolistic Product Market 
As of 2016, there were 4,399 banking institutions in China, including 5 
SOCBs, 12 JSCBs, 134 CCBs, 1,114 RCBs, 8 private banks, 39 foreign banks, 
and 1 postal saving bank. 187  Undoubtedly, the degree of competition in 
China’s banking market has increased significantly in the past four decades. 
A closer examination of the composition of this market, however, still 
reveals the oligopoly of China’s banking market. As of 2016, the 5 SOCBs 
still held over 37% of bank assets in China and dominated China’s banking 
market.188 Such an oligopoly, however, does not seem unbreakable. As Chart 
5 indicates, the market share of SOCBs declined significantly from 55% in 
2006 to 37% in 2015. In contrast, JSCBs grew by 51%, CCBs doubled in size, 
and RCBs grew 7.6 times larger.189 If this trend continues, competition in 
China’s banking sector might become more robust in the future.190  
  
                                                 
186 See generally Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions, 
30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131 (2010) (illustrating the general corporate governance environment in China). 
187 CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 32, at 26–27. 
188 Id. at 27. 
189 See id. at 184. 
190 See generally BING XU ET AL., BANCO DE ESPANA, MEASURING COMPETITION IN CHINA: A 
COMPARISON OF NEW VERSUS CONVENTIONAL APPROACHES APPLIED TO LOAN MARKETS (2014) (analyzing 
the enhanced competition in China’s bank lending market). 
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Chart 5: Market Share of Different Types of Banks (2006-2016)191 
 
That said, one should not overlook the fact that the CCP’s party system 
dominates most Chinese commercial banks. Accordingly, in a more general 
sense, all Chinese banks are affiliates of each other to some extent. Except for 
some privately-operated and foreign banks, they share the same controller—
the CCP. Under this CCP umbrella, they might still compete with each other 
based on market principles in ordinary times; however, if needed, the CCP can 
also easily coordinate their behaviors. The recent collusion between twenty-
nine banks in Zhejiang to agree on a ceiling deposit rate in 2016 suggests that 
the CCP can intervene to inhibit market competition.192 
                                                 
191 See CBRC 2016 REPORT, supra note 32, at 184. 
192 In September 2016, up to 29 banks in Zhejiang entered into a “self-discipline agreement on deposit 
rate pricing,” in which they agreed on a set of ceiling rates for different types of deposits. Some market 
observers suspected that such “self-discipline agreement” was, in fact, the result of the regulators’ implicit 
mandate. Bao Hui (包慧), Zhejiang 29 jia yinhang dingli cunkuan lilu gongshou tongmeng shangfu zuigao 
bu chao 40% (浙江 29家银行订立存款利率攻守同盟 上浮最高不超 40%)[29 Banks in Zhejiang Agreed 
on an Alliance in Deposit Rate, The Upper Limits Will not Float above 40%], 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD 
(21世纪经济报道), Sept. 14, 2016. 
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In addition, the undersupply of banking services in China also distorts 
the market competition. As of 2016, the number of commercial bank branches 
per 100,000 adults was only 8.8 in China.193 This was not only significantly 
lower than that of other advanced countries such as Japan (34.1), United States 
(30.1), South Korea (16.3), or Germany (13.5)194 but also significantly lower 
than that of major emerging countries such as Russia (30.1), Brazil (20.4), or 
India (14.1).195 This suggests that despite the huge size of banks, banking 
service remains under-supplied in China. In other words, there is a supplier’s 
market under which banking service suppliers like Chinese commercial banks 
possess more bargaining power and dominate the supply-demand relationship. 
In this case, the restraint that product market and market consumers can 
impose on bank executives, if any, is limited. 
2. Restricted Capital Market 
Competition in China’s capital market is generally limited. Specifically, 
China still maintains the prior approval requirement governing any IPOs on 
China’s stock exchanges, 196  which significantly restricts the access of 
Chinese commercial banks to the capital market in the following ways. 
First, the timeline for the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(“CSRC”) to approve the listing application of Chinese commercial banks is 
highly ambiguous. As of 2017, there were twenty-five commercial banks 
listed on China’s stock exchanges. In 2016, the CSRC approved the listing of 
eight commercial banks, and it approved another one in 2017. This listing 
wave, however, was after a long wait. Taking the Bank of Jiangsu as an 
example, the Bank of Jiangsu declared its intention to hold an IPO on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007. In 2010, after series of back and forth, the 
CSRC finally accepted its application and sent the application for deliberation. 
After that, however, the CSRC was silent for five years. On July 1, 2015, the 
                                                 
193 Commercial Bank Branches (Per 100,000 adults), WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5?contextual=default&locations=CN-–US-JP-DE-
KR-IN-FR-RU-BR (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 ZHENGQUAN FA (证券法) [LAW ON SECURITIES] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 10, CLI.1.60599(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
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CSRC finally announced that it had approved the application.197 On July 4, 
2015, however, fearing that new IPOs might aggravate the collapsing stock 
market in China, 198  the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange both announced that they would suspend all ongoing IPOs.199 This 
moved the Bank of Jiangsu back to the CSRC’s listing waitlist. Only in 
November 2015 did the CSRC again announce that Bank of Jiangsu passed 
its listing approval and bring it back to the IPO process again.200 In August 
2016, after a long wait of six years, the Bank of Jiangsu finally accomplished 
its IPO in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This case reflects the lengthy and 
uncertain IPO process in China’s stock market, which constitutes an entry 
restriction that precludes fair competition for capital between banks.201 
Second, even if it approves the IPO application, the CSRC intervenes 
in the terms and conditions of IPOs, including the IPO volume. In the case of 
the Bank of Jiangsu, it initially planned to issue around 2.6 billion shares and 
raise around RMB 16 billion but, in the end, it only issued 1.15 billion shares 
                                                 
197 Tang Qiang (唐强), Liu jia gongsi IPO guo hui san zhi yingzi gu cangshen jiangsu yinhang (六家
公司 IPO 过会  三只影子股藏身江苏银行) [Six Companies Pass the IPO Approval, Three Shadow 
Shareholders Hide Behind the Bank of Jiangsu], NAT’L BUS. DAILY (每经网), July 2, 2015. 
198 The fear was that new IPOs might attract some of the investment funds in China’s stock market, 
which might, in turn, result in the withdrawal of investment from the already-listed Chinese public companies 
and lead to sale pressure of these stocks. This would render the stock price of China’s stock market continue 
going down. 
199 Chen Yang (陈扬), Jiangsu yinhang shangshi zai yu bianliang ji bu ziben jin jihua geqian (江苏银
行上市再遇变量 急补资本金计划搁浅) [The Listing of Bank of Jiangsu Face Changes Again, Its Plan to 
Replenish Capital Suspended], BEIJING NEWS (新京报), July 13, 2015. 
200 Zhao Shiyong (赵士勇), Jiangsu yinhang IPO erguofa shen hui shi ge ba nian cheng shanghang 
shangshi qihang (江苏银行 IPO 二过发审会 时隔八年城商行上市起航) [The IPO of Bank of Jiangsu 
Pass the Review for the Second Time, The Listing of City Commercial Banks Sail After Eight Years], CHINA 
TIMES (华夏时报), Nov. 19, 2015. 
201 That was why many city commercial banks turned to list in Hong Kong in the 2010s. Examples 
included Bank of Chongqing, Bank of Huishang, Bank of Harbin, Bank of Shengjing, Bank of Jinzhou, Bank 
of Qingdao, Bank of Zhengzhou. See Cui Qibin (崔启斌) & Zou Chenghui (邹晨辉), Cheng shanghang 
zaixin “qi A zhuan H” chao zhengzhou yinhang ni zai gang shangshi (城商行再现“弃 A转 H”潮 郑州银
行拟在港上市) [A Trend of “Abandoning A and Shifting to H” Reemerges among City Commercial Banks; 
Bank of Zhengzhou Planned to List in Hong Kong], BEIJING BUS. DAILY (北京商报), Oct. 13, 2015. 
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and raised RMB 7.24 billion.202 Similar situations also happened with other 
commercial banks listed in 2016: Wuxi Rural Commercial Bank initially 
planned to issue 550 million shares but ultimately only issued 190 million 
shares.203 Jiangyin Rural Commercial Bank initially planned to issue 400 
million shares but ended up only issuing 210 million shares.204 Changsho 
Rural Commercial Bank initially planned to issue 350 million shares but, in 
the end, only issued 220 million shares.205 CSRC reduced their issuance 
volume out of the concern that large-scale IPOs might divert investment and 
crash the stock market price in China. Such intervention, however, limits the 
fundraising of Chinese commercial banks. It also distorts the stock market in 
China and limits the corporate governance function of capital markets. 
In addition to the above, the Chinese party-state also intervenes in the 
capital market by manipulating stock prices. In the stock market collapse of 
July 2015, the Chinese party-state, through the China Securities Finance 
Company as well as a large number of securities firms,206 injected a huge 
amount of funds to keep the stock market from collapsing. A large proportion 
of the injected funds flowed to the banking stocks. As of September 2015, 
China Securities Finance Company had purchased stocks of fourteen listed 
banks, including 2.99% of the stock of Shanghai Pudong Bank, China 
Minsheng Bank, Everbright Bank, Huaxia Bank, BoCom, Ping An Bank, 
Industrial Bank, and Bank of Beijing.207 Central Huijin also increased its 
shareholding in the SOCBs.208 It was estimated that China Finance Company 
and Central Huijin invested around RMB 357 billion in purchasing stock of 
listed banks and insurance companies. 209  While these market support 
                                                 
202 Jan Xing (占昕), Qi jia defang yinhang miji shangshi duoshu yinhang mu zi jihua dafu soshui (七
家地方银行密集上市 多数银行募资计划大幅缩水) [Seven Local Banks Intensively List, The Financing 




206 Dai Ruifen (戴瑞芬), Li Keqiang dongyuan 21 juanshangjiu A gu (李克強下令 動員 21券商救 A
股) [Li Keqiang Orders: Mobilizing Twenty-one Securities Firms to Save the A-Stock], ECON. DAILY (經濟
日報), July 5, 2016. 
207 Zheng jin yu huijin chizi shu qian yi mai ru shisi jian yinhang he xian qi (证金与汇金斥资数千亿
买入十四家银行和险企) [Securities Finance and Central Huijin Spend Hundreds of Billions to Purchase 
Fourteen Banks and Insurance Companies], 21ST CENTURY BUS. HERALD (21世纪经济报道), Nov. 4, 2015.  
208 Id.  
209 Id. 
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measures might be necessary for preventing financial crisis in China, they 
distorted the fair competition in the stock market. Specifically, they 
discouraged listed banks from being concerned with their business 
performance, which created moral hazards in China’s stock market. 
B. Paternalistic Regulatory Environment 
The relationship between banking regulations and bank governance can 
be a double-edged sword. On the one side, banking regulations and bank 
governance complement each other.210 On the other side, banking regulation 
can also pose unique issues that plague bank governance.211 
The banking regulatory system in China has been gradually converging 
toward international best practices standards. For instance, China has adopted 
most of the best practices recommended by the Basel III Principles.212 These 
risk-based standards, to some extent, provide a safeguard to Chinese 
commercial banks against the request from the Chinese party-state. For 
example, when asked by the Chinese party-state to cooperate with a state 
policy, they might be able to refuse it by justifying that the policy mandate 
                                                 
210 Peter O. Mulbert, Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis – Theory, Evidence, 
Reforms 25–26 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 130, 2010), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id1448118.pdf. See also Renee 
Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies, 9 ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 123 (2003); Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks: A Financial Stability Perspective 
8 (Ctr. For Econ. Stud. Working Paper, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024693; 
Dirk Heremans & Katrien Bosquet, The Future of Law and Finance after the Financial Crisis: New 
Perspectives on Regulation and Corporate Governance for Banks, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1551, 1568 (2011). 
211 For instance, deposit insurance mechanism creates the well-known moral hazard problems, under 
which depositors have little incentive to monitor banks. Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: 
A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence 10–11 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
3404, 2004) (summarizing three characteristics of banks, including that banks are opaque and heavily 
regulated and widely involve government ownership); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The 
Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 97 (2003). Capital adequacy requirement also 
provides incentives for shareholders to undertake excessive risks because higher capital requirement causes 
shareholders to ask for higher investment premium. This induces the management to take riskier business 
strategy to satisfy the needs of shareholders. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation, and 
Risk Taking, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (2009); MULBERT, supra note 210 at 16–19. 
212 See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME (RCAP): ASSESSMENT OF BASEL III REGULATIONS – CHINA (2013), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/l2_cn.pdf (assessing the capital regulatory regime in China to be 
“Compliant”); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME (RCAP): ASSESSMENT OF BASEL III LCR REGULATIONS – CHINA (2017), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d411.pdf (assessing the liquidity coverage ratio regulation in China to be 
“Compliant”). 
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entails excessive risks that may render the bank failing the risk threshold.213 
Hence, even if the party system dominates Chinese banks, the potential for it 
to over-intervene in the operation of banks may be mitigated. 
Chinese banking regulators, however, also maintain a number of special 
regulations dictating specific governance practices or operational standards 
for banks, which aggravate the problems underlying the party-dominated 
governance system. Below are some examples. 
1. Agreed Loan Scale 
The Peoples Bank of China (“PBOC”) maintained the so-called “agreed 
loan scale,” a loan quota system, to control the aggregate loan scale in 
China.214 Under this system, each Chinese commercial bank is required to 
report its agreed annual scale of loans at the beginning of a year. The PBOC 
would, based on the amount and growth of a bank’s loan, determine whether 
to approve the ceiling loan scale.215 After the approval, each bank must lend 
in accordance with this limit every year: its annual loans cannot exceed the 
limit, and they cannot be significantly lower than the limit as well.216 This is 
a product of the planned economy, but the PBOC also uses this measure to 
prevent excessive expansion in loans and thereby control inflation. 
Although the agreed loan scale facilitates the PBOC’s monetary control, 
it compromises the market competition of the banking sector and the 
operational freedom of individual banks. Furthermore, the agreed loan scale 
causes scarcity in credit resources in China. In practice, many commercial 
banks extended a large number of loans at the beginning of the year, but when 
their loan scale approaches the ceiling limit, they refrain from lending near 
the year end, especially when lending to small and micro enterprises 
                                                 
213 For a related discussion, see generally Wei Liu, Basel III and Bank Regulation in China, 7 J. LEGAL 
TECH. RISK MGMT. 1 (2014) (introducing how China responded to the Basel III and incorporated it into its 
domestic laws). 
214 Lide Shangyu (李德尚玉), Jie kai heyi daikuan shenmi miansha (揭开合意贷款神秘面纱) 
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(“SMEs”). 217  This causes seasonal financing difficulties for borrowers, 
escalates the credit cost, and aggravates the financial constraint in China.218 
2. Restrictions on Executive Compensation 
In recent years, the CCP also intervened in the compensation of bank 
executives, which significantly impacted the labor market in China’s banking 
sector. In 2014, as part of the plan to reform Chinese SOEs, the CCP decided 
to restrict the compensation of SOE executives. 219  It implemented this 
restriction in 2015.220 The restriction directly applies to the chairperson of the 
board of directors, CEO, the chairperson of the board of supervisors, and other 
vice presidents of the enterprises administered by the central government, 
including the five SOCBs.221 Specifically, it limits the compensation of these 
executives to no more than eight times of the average employees’ salary.222 
According to the CCP, this restriction is responsive to the public’s perception 
that the state overpays SOE executives.223 
The restriction significantly reduced the compensation of bank 
executives. As Chart 6 indicates, in 2015, the chairpersons’ compensation in 
most listed Chinese commercial banks dropped significantly. The drop was, 
in particular, prominent in the SOCBs because the CCP’s compensation 
                                                 
217 Liu Zhendong (刘振冬), Yinhang panhuo cunliang ying jiechu “heyi daikuan” shufu (银行盘活存
量应解除“合意贷款”束缚) [To Mobilize the Stock, Banks Should be Free From the Constraint of “Agreed 
Loan”], ECON. INFO. DAILY (经济参考报), July 8, 2015. 
218 Id. 
219 CCP, Zhongyang guanli qiye fuze ren xinchou zhidu giage fang an (中央管理企業負責人薪酬制
度改革方案 ) [Reform Scheme on Executive Compensation of the Central State-Owned Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the Central Politburo of Communist Party of China, Aug. 29, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015).  
220 Lin Chenyi (林宸誼), 72 Jia yangqi dongzuo kongjian xin baiwan (72家央企董座 恐減薪百萬) 
[The Compensation of the Chairpersons of 72 Central SOEs Might Reduce for RMB 1 Million], ECON. DAILY 
(經濟日報), Nov. 24, 2014. 
221 Guan Jin (闫瑾), “Ruoshi” yinhang jiang xinliao buliang zichan tunshi jixiao jiangjin, (“弱势”银
行降薪了 不良资产吞噬绩效奖金) [“Weak” Banks Reduce the Salary, NPLs Swallow the Performance 
Bonus], CHINA ECON. NET (中国经济网), Aug. 31, 2015. 
222 Lin, supra note 220. 
223 Ma Rohu (马若虎), Guoqi xinchou gaige, buzhi yujiang xin (国企薪酬改革，不止于降薪) [SOEs 
Compensation Reform is not Limited to Compensation Reduction], XINHUA NET (新华网), Sept. 15, 2015. 
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restriction directly applies to them. 224  The reduction of executive 
compensation led to a wave of resignations among bank executives in 2015. 
In 2015, around fifty bank executives resigned from their posts; many of them 
instead turned to internet finance companies, financial department of well-
known enterprises, or private banks, 225  which led to a shortage of vice 
presidents in many banks.226 In the future, traditional banks will have a harder 
time competing for top talent in the market. 
Chart 6: Chairperson Compensation of Listed Banks (2013-2015)227 
 
C. Hostile Takeover 
Hostile takeovers, or the potential for hostile takeovers, are also a 
crucial tool to control the agency cost of corporate managers. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
224 It is estimated that the compensation of the SOCBs’ top executives dropped 50% in 2015. Wang Jie 
(王洁), Shangshi gongsi gao guan qianwan nianxin jueji, yinhang gao guan jiangfu jin 50% (上市公司高管
千万年薪绝迹 银行高管降幅近 50%) [No More Top Executives of Listed Companies Earn RMB Tens of 
Millions, The Drop in Bank Executives Approach 50 Percent], MORNING POST (晨报), Sept. 18, 2016. 
225 Cheng Weimiao (程维妙), Zhongduo yinhang fuxing zhang zhiwei, chuantong yinhang ying rencai 
juezhu shidai (众多银行副行长职位告急 传统银行迎人才角逐时代) [Many Banks are Seeking the Post 
of Vice Presidents, Traditional Banks Are Facing Competition for Talents], BEIJING BUS. TODAY (北京商报), 
June 20, 2016. 
226 Id. 





















January 2019 Crouching Tigers and Hidden Dragons on the     47 




they are unsurprisingly absent in China’s banking sector for the following 
reasons.  
First, most Chinese commercial banks have a controlling shareholder, 
which makes hostile takeovers less likely to succeed. To be sure, many of 
these controlling shareholders do not hold majority shares,228 which makes 
them susceptible to potential hostile takeovers. Unfortunately, since these 
controlling shareholders are mostly public entities, would-be market acquirers 
dare not even attempt a takeover.  
Second, any change of shareholders who hold 5% or more of the total 
amount of shares must obtain the CBRC’s approval,229 which further reduces 
the success rate of hostile takeovers. The case of CMB is illustrative. Before 
2013, the ownership structure of CMB was nearly equally distributed among 
the major private shareholders, with no clear dominant shareholder.230 This 
structure presented an opportunity to outside acquirers. Anbang Insurance 
made its move in 2014. Its shareholding of CMB increased from very minimal 
in 2013 to 13.62% by 2014231 and 17.77% by 2015,232 which made it the 
single largest shareholder of CMB. By CMB’s board re-election in 2017, 
however, the CBRC had not approved the eligibility of Anbang Insurance for 
serving as CMB’s major shareholder,233 rendering Anbang Insurance unable 
to obtain real control over the CMB. In the 2017 board re-election, Anbang 
Insurance only secured one seat on CMB’s board of directors subject to the 
CBRC’s review of his eligibility.234 
Finally, under the party-dominated system, even if an acquirer 
successfully acquires the majority shares of a commercial bank, the party 
                                                 
228 See Annex 1. 
229 Commercial Bank Law, supra note 44, art. 24(5). 
230 See CHINA MERCHANTS BANK, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 58–60 (2014). 
231 CHINA MERCHANTS BANK, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 101 (2015). 
232 CHINA MERCHANTS BANK, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 93 (2016). 
233 Zhou Pengfeng (周鹏锋), Anbang “tunbing” minsheng yinhang sannian: guodong ji dongshi zige 
rengwei huopi (安邦“屯兵”民生银行三年：股东及董事资格仍未获批) [Anbang Have “Stationed” at CMB 
for Three Years, Its Shareholder and Director Eligibility Remains Unapproved], SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS (上
海证券报), June 15, 2017. 
234  CHINA MERCHANTS BANK, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 98 (2018). In February 2018, the Chinese 
Insurance Regulatory Commission arrested Xiaohui Wu, the chairman of Anbang Group, and indicted him 
of fundraising fraud and embezzlement. The CIRC further seized the control of Anbang Insurance. Tom 
Hancock et al., China Seizes Anbang in Latest Move to Curb Dealmakers, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/5d548e98-183e-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640. After that, the only shareholder 
director also resigned from the board of CMB.  
48 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
system can prevent them from obtaining operational control by limiting their 
personnel power over the bank executives. As illustrated above, in China’s 
banking sector there is an issue of separation between ownership and control. 
Majority shares do not necessarily bring control over the executive team due 
to the influence of the party system. Hostile takeovers thus become “a flower 
in the mirror and the moon in the water”—that is, an illusion in China’s 
banking sector. 
IV. THE AGENCY PROBLEMS OF THE CROUCHING-TIGER-HIDDEN-DRAGON 
MODEL 
The Chinese party-state appears to be satisfied with the Crouching-
Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model. It repeatedly claims that the party’s leadership 
is necessary for developing China’s economy,235 and the Crouching-Tiger-
Hidden-Dragon model facilitates party leadership in the banking sector. This 
heightens party-state intervention in the corporate decisions of Chinese 
commercial banks. While the CCP repeatedly alleges that such heightened 
party-state intervention can promote the overall social welfare in China, in 
this section I offer a critical assessment of this Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-
Dragon model from an agency theory perspective. I identify a number of 
agency problems underlying the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model that 
might discount the CCP’s alleged optimism. These agency problems have 
actually worsened in recent years.  
A. The Heightened Party-State Intervention 
The most obvious impact of the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon 
model is the increasing focus of Chinese commercial banks on party-state 
interest rather than the bank’s own best interests. Under this model, the 
Chinese party-state determines the appointment, removal, reward, and 
promotion of bank executives. Bank executives, thus, owe their accountability 
mainly to the CCP instead of the bank’s financial investors. Therefore, their 
operational decisions are less business-oriented and more party-interest-
                                                 
235 See, e.g., PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, DI SHIER JIE QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI DI SI CI HUIYI 
GUANYU GUOMIN JINGJI H SHEHUI FAZHAN DI SHISAN GE WU NIAN GUIHUA GANGYAO DE JUEYI (第十二届全
国人民代表大会第四次会议关于国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要的决议) [DECISION 
REGARDING THE OUTLINE OF THE THIRTEENTH FIVE–YEAR PLAN ON NATIONAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT], Chapter 2 (2016); THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, QUANGUO RENMIN 
DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGZUO BAOGAO (全国人民代表大会常务委员会工作报告) 
[WORKING REPORT], para. 4(3) (2016). 
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oriented, 236  which compromises the operational efficiency of Chinese 
commercial banks.237 
To be fair, the CCP does not intervene in the operational decision of 
Chinese commercial banks on a frequent basis. For instance, despite its 
control over the executive personnel of Chinese commercial banks, the CCP 
does not dictate each and every loan extended by each bank. In most cases, 
the CCP only directs Chinese banks to support a specific industry, while 
leaving the banks free to determine which specific firm to lend to in that 
designated industry.238 That said, once in a while when there are policy needs, 
the CCP does ask Chinese commercial banks to support its policies. Fearing 
that non-cooperation will jeopardize their future career in the party system, 
bank executives tend to obey or, at least, not to depart significantly from the 
party’s direction.239 In this way, the Chinese party-state obtains an easy access 
to the funds of Chinese commercial banks, which would be less available if 
bank executives were more business-oriented.  
Consider the example of the 2015 stock market collapse in China. To 
prevent further collapse, the Chinese government designated the China 
Securities Finance Company to support China’s stock markets by buying in 
the blue-chip stocks in the Chinese stock market, which required an 
unprecedented amount of funds.240 In less than two weeks, however, China 
Securities Finance Company managed to raise RMB 1.3 trillion from 
seventeen Chinese banks.241 This situation exemplifies the philosophy of the 
Chinese party-state: although it does not need to exercise its dominance over 
Chinese commercial banks each and every day, maintaining this dominance is 
useful in case of emergencies. 
                                                 
236 See HE WEI PING, BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 
151 (2014) (arguing that “in China, private interest in banking regulation ultimately equates to the interest of 
the government”). 
237 Id.  
238 MCGREGOR, supra note 20, at 68–69 (stating that “with the need to be profitable and compete 
globally, top executives of state enterprise these days have a relative freedom to run their businesses”).  
239 Id. 
240 Wu Hongyuran (吴红毓然), Zhengjin Gongsi huo yinhang shuxie 1.22 wanyi shengqing guimo kan 
bi 4 wanyi (證金公司獲銀行輸血 1.22萬億 申請規模堪比 4萬億) [The Securities Finance Co. Received 
the Banks’ Injection of RMB 1.22 Trillion, The Scale of Application can be Compared with the RMB 4 Trillion], 
CAIXIN NET (财新网), July 18, 2015. 
241 Id. 
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In the eyes of the Chinese party-state, lessened operational efficiency 
of Chinese banks might not be much of a problem compared with the overall 
public welfare. In China, commercial banks should concern not only their own 
business development but also the advancement of the state’s policies. Article 
34 of China’s Commercial Banks Law stipulates, “[c]ommercial banks shall 
conduct their business of lending in accordance with the needs of the national 
economic and social development and under the guidance of the industrial 
policies of the State.”242 In accordance with this provision, Chinese banks 
undertake the duty to carry out state policies, including monetary policies, 
industrial policies, infrastructure projects, employment, and social support, 
among others. 243  In performing these policy mandates, Chinese banks 
inevitably accrue below-expectation profits and sometimes incur additional 
risks. This is, however, a necessary tradeoff. Maximizing the public welfare 
requires a balance between the banks’ own operational interests and the public 
interests; bank executives might be better at pursuing banks’ interests, but the 
party-state is better at safeguarding public interests. To balance banks’ 
interests, the party-state is willing to leave some maneuvering room for bank 
executives and refrain from intervening in banks’ operational decisions on a 
daily basis, but when there are policy needs, bank executives need to 
cooperate with the party-state. 
B. The Agency Problems in China’s Banking Sector 
Whether this policy-oriented model of bank governance better serves 
the public welfare is not the focus of this paper. Theoretically, it is possible 
that such model, when exercised properly, can fix the market failures caused 
by the purely business-oriented model of bank governance. In the real world, 
however, such optimal scenarios projected by the party-state can be 
compromised by a number of inherent agency problems. Moreover, we have 
witnessed these problems in China’s banking sector in recent years. 
                                                 
242 Commercial Banks Law, supra note 44, art. 34. 
243 For instance, in an opinion issued by the PBOC, Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission 
(“CBRC”) and other departments in February 2016, the central government explicitly encouraged banks to 
lower the down payment ratio for alternative fuel vehicles and used vehicles, and to support industries such 
as iron and steel, nonferrous metals, building materials, shipbuilding, and coal. Guanyu jinrong zhichi gongye 
wen zhengzhang diao jiegou zeng xiaoyi de ruogan yijian (关于金融支持工业稳增长调结构增效益的若
干意见) [Several Opinions on Leveraging Financial Services to Support the Industrial Sector to Stabilize 
Growth, Adjust Structure and Raise Efficiency] (promulgated by People’s Bank of China, St. Dev. & Reform 
Comm. & Ministry of Indus. & Info., Feb. 14, 2016, effective Feb., 14, 2016), para. 2, CLI.4.264232(EN) 
(Lawinfochina). 
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1. Agency Problem I: The Misalignment Between Public 
Welfare and the Party-State’s Interest 
The first suboptimal scenario rests on the party-state’s failure to pursue 
the public welfare. The Chinese party-state for a long time has claimed that it 
safeguards the public welfare on behalf of Chinese citizens.244 This is not 
always the case. It can fail either because it misjudges the situation or because 
political concerns rather than policy concerns unduly affect its decisions. The 
result of such occasional failure could be disastrous.245 
The party-state might design a wrong policy simply due to misjudgment. 
For instance, the stimulus plan in 2009 that injected RMB 4 trillion to support 
China’s economy was very controversial. As a result of the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008, China’s economy appeared to be cooling down. To prevent an 
economic slowdown, the Chinese government infused RMB 4 trillion (around 
US $586 billion) into the economy as a stimulus.246 Of this amount, RMB 1.6 
trillion (or US $233 billion) came from bank loans. 247  To perform this 
mandate, Chinese banks expanded their loans at a stunning pace: in 2009, their 
total new lending reached US $1.4 trillion, almost 30% of China’s GDP.248 
This stimulus package, however, created a huge bubble in the market because 
there was not a high demand for money in China.249 Most stimulus funds 
flowed to infrastructure, which made up 38% of the stimulus plan and half of 
total medium and long-term lending in 2009.250 This was particularly the case 
for Chinese local governments: to perform the mandate, they had no choice 
but to borrow huge amounts of money from Chinese banks to invest in local 
infrastructure or housing with barely any expected return. This eventually 
evolved into the local debt crises, resulting in a RMB 3.2 trillion debt 
                                                 
244 See XIANFA, pmbl. (2012) (providing that “The CCP . . . represents the development need of China’s 
advanced productivity, the forward direction of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of 
China’s most general citizens. . . .”). 
245 For similar observations, see STENT, supra note 23, at 154. 
246 Supporting China’s Infrastructure Stimulus Under the INFRA Platform, WORLD BANK: INFRA 
UPDATE, June 2010, at 1, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSDNET/Resources/5944695-
1247775731647/INFRA_China_Newsletter.pdf. 
247 Id. at 1. 
248 Id. at 1–2. 
249 For a discussion, see generally LANG XIANPING (郎咸平) & SUN JIN (孫晉), ZHONGGUO JINGJI 
DAOLE ZUI WEIXIAN DE BIANYUAN (中國經濟到了最危險的邊緣) [CHINA’S ECONOMY HAS APPROACHED 
THE MOST DANGEROUS EDGE] 40–63 (2012) (summarizing the data related to the real estate market in China 
and arguing the presence of a bubble therein). 
250 Supporting China’s Infrastructure Stimulus Under the INFRA Platform, supra note 248, at 1–2. 
 
52 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
replacement program in 2015.251 Moreover, many local investments made 
under the stimulus plan turned out to be simply a social waste. 252  This 
illustrates that the party-state, even in good faith, can at times fail to achieve 
social welfare through their use of Chinese banks, and such failure can be 
disastrous and wasteful. 
The party-state might also design a wrong policy because political 
interests taint the decision process. After all, the party-state’s interest is not 
solely the pursuit of public policies; it also contains complicated politics 
within the CCP. For instance, as part of the party system, Chinese commercial 
banks must obey the power structure and rank within the CCP, which 
                                                 
251 Traditionally, local governments in China were responsible for most of the infrastructure investment, 
public service, and social spending, which accounted for around 85% of China’s public spending. Their 
funding, however, was severely constrained due to their limited authority in tax collection. Accordingly, for 
long period of time, they relied on bank loans to fund local development: it was estimated that banks supplied 
62% of local governments’ funding. In 2009, to perform the central government’s stimulus plan, in which 
local governments were responsible for US $410 billion of finance, their borrowings from banks rose by 70% 
in one year, most of which went to sectors unable to generate adequate cash flow for repayment. This practice 
created a huge amount of non-repayable local debts. See Leo F. Goodstadt, The Local Government Crisis 
2007–2014: When China’s Financial Management Faltered 1–3 (H.K. Inst. for Monetary Res., Working 
Paper No. 27, 2014), http://www.hkimr.org/uploads/publication/399/wp-no-27_2014-final-.pdf. 
The problem of rapid fiscal expansion without rational constraint finally came to a head. In June 2013, 
local governments owed RMB 10.88 trillion debt, in which bank loans accounted for RMB 5.53 trillion, 
which was more than half of the debts due. As this huge amount of local debt was about to become due, the 
lack of fiscal discipline of local governments appeared unsustainable in 2015. This forced the central 
government to launch a series of debt-replacement programs to rescue local governments. In March 2015, 
the MOF approved the replacement of RMB 1 trillion local debt. In June 2015, it approved another RMB 1 
trillion. In August 2015, it approved another RMB 1.2 trillion. In 2015 and 2016, it is estimated that local 
governments completed the replacement of RMB 8.1 trillion of local debts. By replacing their debts and 
postponing the due date, local governments could finally take a breath. Id. 
Despite this bitter experience, local governments continue using the local government financing 
vehicles (“LGFVs”) to raise debts for supporting local development. As of August 2016, these LGFVs had 
issued RMB 1.2 trillion of corporate bonds for the year 2016, exceeding the scale of 2015, while banks were 
again the major investors. Highly-leveraged local governments have become a potential threat to China’s 
banking system. For an introduction to how LGFVs function in China, see generally Liao Fan, Quenching 
Thirst with Poison? Local Government Financing Vehicles – Past, Present, and Future, in REGULATING THE 
VISIBLE HAND, supra note 21, at 69 (examining the origin, development, operational models, and challenges 
of the local government financing vehicles in China). See also Shaun Breslin, Financial Transitions in the 
PRC: Banking on the State?, 35 THIRD WORLD Q. 996 (2014) (discussing the complicated relationship 
between local governments, land, the banking system, and other key economic sectors in China). For a 
discussion of the gaming between local governments and the CBRC, see HE WEI PING, supra note 236, at 
136–38. 
252 For instance, according to the investigation of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(“NDRC”), by May 2016, the “new towns” or “new districts” developed by local governments had the 
capacity to accommodate at least 3.4 billion residents, while the entire Chinese population was “merely” 1.3 
billion. Cai Minzi (蔡敏姿), Lu chong chengzhen hua maochu renkou dakeng (陸衝城鎮化冒出人口大坑) 
[Mainland China Rush for Urbanization and Big Holes of Population Pop Out], ECON. DAILY NEWS (經濟
日報), July 15, 2016.  
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compromises not only the business interests of banks but also the pursuit of 
social welfare. SOCBs’ loans to SOEs provide a good example. One might 
expect that SOCBs, as the major funders of SOEs, could discipline SOEs’ 
business decisions and promote SOEs’ operational efficiency, like the main 
bank system in Japan.253 The reality, however, is the opposite. Under the 
CCP’s party system, SOEs’ top leaders often possess more senior party ranks 
than SOCBs’ top leaders.254 Accordingly, although SOCBs seem to possess 
leverage in their business relationship with SOEs, they are in fact the 
subordinate according to the political relationship. 255  Hence, instead of 
improving SOEs’ operational efficiency, the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon 
model actually compromises SOCBs’ own operational efficiencies.256 Bank 
funds thus largely flow to the less productive SOEs, resulting in the financial 
constraint of private sectors. It is estimated that private sectors contributed to 
two-thirds of China’s GDP but only accounted for one-third of bank loans in 
China. 257  Such inefficient allocation of funds not only prevents private 
sectors from growing but also channels bank funds to SOEs which are less 
productive and thus riskier. This also creates a substantial risk for the safety 
and soundness of China’s banking sector. 
2. Agency Problem II: The Misalignment Between the Party-
State’s Interest and Bank Executives’ Interest 
Even if the government is right in its design of policies to benefit the 
public, banks do not necessarily implement them correctly and efficiently. 
Chinese banks do not always obey the party-state’s policy mandate. Instead, 
they may have their own interests that are incompatible with the policy goals, 
while the party-state, constrained by the informational asymmetry, may fail to 
detect or punish the resulting deviation by the banks.258  
                                                 
253 For an introduction to the main bank system, see generally, Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and 
Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 399 (1989) (introducing the 
main bank system in Japan and how it shapes Japan’s corporate governance practice); Takeo Hoshi et al., The 
Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990) (introducing 
how the main bank system in Japan functioned to rescue the enterprises at the verge of insolvency). 
254 WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 24, at 166–71. 
255 For a discussion of the credit subsidy provided by SOCBs to SOEs, see XIANPING (郎咸平) & JIN 
(孫晉), supra note 249, at 119. 
256 See DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: THE PARTIAL POWER 160 (2013). 
257 NICHOLAS R. LARDY, MARKETS OVER MAO: THE RISE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES IN CHINA 99–112 
(2014). 
258 For similar observations, see STENT, supra note 23, at 154. 
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The financial constraint of private sectors as mentioned above is 
illustrative of this point. To address the financial constraint of SMEs in China, 
the Chinese government has imposed a specific obligation on Chinese banks 
to extend loans to SMEs since 2011. The obligation has evolved from the “two 
no less than” obligation in 2011259 to the “three no less than” obligation in 
2015.260 Despite these explicit policies, Chinese SMEs, which are generally 
more productive than SOEs, still face difficulties in obtaining financing. Only 
46.2% of SMEs were able to obtain loans from banks in 2014.261 This is 
mainly because, in the eyes of Chinese banks, SME loans are simply too risky. 
The cash flows of SMEs are fairly unstable, their financial records are less 
than complete, they are unable to issue adequate collateral to secure their loans, 
and they are private businesses which lack an implicit guarantee from the 
government.262 Since banks only accrue fixed interest revenue from SMEs 
loans, which might not be adequate to cover their potential losses, it is rational, 
from the banks’ perspective, for banks to refrain from engaging in SME 
loans.263 Instead, banks prefer to lend their money to the government or SOEs 
even though the public sector is less productive.264  
                                                 
259 The two obligations are: first, each bank’s annual growth rate of SMEs loans shall not be less than 
its annual growth rate of all loans, and second, each bank’s annual increased amount of SMEs loans shall not 
be less than its previous year’s increase amount. Zhongguo yinjainhui guanyu zhichi shangye yinhang jinyibu 
gaijin xiaoxing weixing qiye jinrong fuwu de buchong tongzhi (中国银监会关于支持商业银行进一步改
进小型微型企业金融服务的补充通知) [Supplementary Notice of the Chinese Banking Regulatory 
Comm’n on Supporting Commercial Banks to Further Improve Financial Services for Small and Micro 
Enterprises] (promulgated by Chinese Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Oct. 24, 2011, effective Oct. 24, 2011), 
para. 1(1), CLI.4.160143(EN) (Lawinfochina). 
260 The three obligations are: first, each bank’s annual growth rate of SMEs loans shall not be less than 
its annual growth rate of all loans; second, each bank’s number of SME customers shall not be less than 
previous year’s customer number, and third, the approval rate of SMEs application shall not be less than 
previous year’s approval rate. Zhongguo yinjianhui guanyu 2015 nian xiao wei qiye jinrong fuwu gongzuo 
de zhidao yijian (中国银监会关于 2015 年小微企业金融服务工作的指导意见) [Guiding Opinions In 
Respect of Financial Service Works for Small and Micro Enterprises in 2015] (promulgated by Chinese 
Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Mar. 3, 2015, effective Mar. 3, 2015), para. 1, CLI.4.244746(EN) 
(LawinfoChina). 
261 XINAN CAIJING DAXUE (西南财经大学 ) [SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND 
ECONOMICS], ZHONGGUO XIAO WEI QIYE FAZHAN BAOGAO 2014 (JIANYAO BAN) (中国小微企业发展报告
2014 (簡要版)) [THE 2014 REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S SMALL AND MICRO ENTERPRISES 
(SUMMARY)] 6–7 (2015). 
262 YIFU LIN (林毅夫 ), JIEDU ZHONGGUO JINGJI (解读中国经济 ) [DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE 
ECONOMY] 199–200 (2012). 
263 Id. at 199–207 (for a discussion of the SMEs loan problem in China).  
264 STENT, supra note 23, at 61. 
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The financial constraint of SMEs has become even more prominent as 
China’s economy has slowed down. Despite the “three no less than” 
obligations, particularly the duty that the SME loan growth shall be no less 
than the gross loan growth, many Chinese commercial banks shrank their 
SME lending business in recent years. As shown in Chart 7, while SOCBs, 
RCBs, and foreign banks steadily increased their SME loan ratio throughout 
2015 to 2017, JSCBs and CCBs did not follow the CBRC’s mandate. Instead, 
we witness a consistent downward trend of the SME ratio in the case of JSCBs 
in 2016 and 2017, and we also started to observe a similar tendency in the case 
of CCBs in 2017. The financial constraint of SMEs in China illustrates that 
the Chinese party-state cannot always direct Chinese banks to implement its 
policy even though China is an authoritarian regime. After all, some policy 
mandates could be challenging, and a party-state-dominated banking system 
does not always possess the required capability or efficiency for implementing 
these challenging tasks. 
Chart 7: SME Loan Ratio of Chinese Commercial Banks by Type (2015-2017)265 
 
                                                 
265 Based on the SME loan data and the aggregate loan data reported in CBRC’s websites. See, e.g., 
CBRC, 2017 NIAN SHANGYE YINHANG ZHUYAO ZHIBAIO FEN JIGOU LEI QINGKUANG BIAO (2017年银行业金
融机构用于小微企业的贷款情况表) [THE TABLE OF THE SME LOANS MADE BY BANKING FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN 2017], FEB. 9, 2018; CBRC, 2017 NIAN YINHANG YE JINRONG JIGOU YONG YU XIAO WEI QIYE 
DE DAIKUAN QINGKUANG BIAO (2017 年商业银行主要指标分机构类情况表) [THE TABLE OF THE KEY 
INDICATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS BY ENTITY IN 2017], FEB. 9, 2018. 
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3. Agency Problem III: The Misalignment Between Banks’ 
Interest and Bank Executives’ Interest 
Finally, within the business ambit left by the Chinese party-state to 
banks, bank executives of Chinese commercial banks still incur the agency 
problem typically seen in ordinary firms, that is, the failure to pursue the 
business interests of banks. The Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model not 
only fails to serve the monitoring function but somehow exacerbates the 
problem. 
A crucial impact of the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model is the 
reduced role of private capital and the lack of diversity in executive 
composition among Chinese commercial banks. Since the Chinese party-state 
dominates the appointment, dismissal, reward, and promotion of bank 
executives, it would prefer to select executive candidates from the party 
system. This results in little diversity in the executive composition of Chinese 
banks.266 As Annex 2 exhibits, among the top thirty-five Chinese commercial 
banks in 2016, only three banks have a board chairperson whose career is 
unaffiliated with the party system,267 and only one bank has such a CEO. In 
addition, only eight banks have at least one top executive whose career is 
unaffiliated with the party system, and only four banks have at least two such 
top executives. This summary, on one hand, shows that despite the 
introduction of private capital, the Chinese party-state tightly controls the 
executive members of major Chinese commercial banks. On the other hand, 
it also suggests low diversity among Chinese bank executives. 
The reduced role of the private capital and the lack of diversity in 
executive composition tends to reinforce group thinking among bank 
executives in China. Absent having someone with a more business-oriented 
background, experience, and mindset, it would be more challenging for 
Chinese banks to engage in new businesses, innovate new products, or adapt 
to new environments.268 The revenue structure of Chinese banks is telling. 
Chinese banks currently remain heavily reliant on traditional loan businesses 
to support their revenue. In 2017, 77.3% of their gross revenue came from 
                                                 
266 For more literature raising similar concerns, see STENT, supra note 23, at 109–10. 
267 This refers to a career which is mainly in the private sector, that is, entities other than the government 
agencies or state-controlled entities. 
268 Stent also observed that Chinese banks typically share a culture which features “the fear of trying 
something different,” which might account for “the failure of the banks to change their organizational 
structure to a more modern model.” STENT, supra note 23, at 121. 
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interest revenue. 269  Fee businesses—which collect commission fees by 
providing services such as bank cards, asset management, clearing and 
settling, investment banking, and guarantees—remained marginal in Chinese 
banks’ business structure, which represented only 22.7% of the gross revenue 
of Chinese commercial banks.270 The poor performance of Chinese banks in 
business innovation and business diversity has much to do with the 
homogenous executive composition caused by the party-state’s dominance.271 
The lack of business diversity among Chinese commercial banks has 
become a serious problem. Due to the interest rate liberalization272 and the 
monetary easing policies 273  that have been implemented since 2015, the 
interest revenue of Chinese banks faces serious challenges. In 2016 and 2017, 
the average net interest rate margin decreased significantly from 2.54% at the 
                                                 
269 CHINESE BANKING REGULATORY COMM’N, SHANGYE YINHANG ZHUYAO JIANGGUAN ZHIBIAO 
QINGKUANG BIAO (FAREN) (2017) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2017年)) [THE TABLE OF MAJOR 
REGULATORY INDICATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS (LEGAL PERSONS) (2017)] (2018). 
270 Id. 
271 In a separate paper, I conduct empirical studies and exhibit that Chinese commercial banks whose 
executive composition is more party-state-oriented are associated with lower fee revenue ratio. See generally 
Yueh-Ping Yang, Does the Proud Dragon Need to Repent? A Survey of the Chinese Party-State's Performance 
in China's Banking Sector (The 12th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Ithaca, Oct. 13–14, 
2017) (empirically studying the association between executive composition and the bank’s performance 
among major Chinese commercial banks). 
272 On October 23, 2015, the PBOC decided to cancel the deposit rate control over commercial banks 
and rural cooperative financial institutions, which thereby achieving full interest rate liberalization in China. 
Zhonguo renmin yinghang jueding xiatiao jinrong jigou renminbi daikuan he cunkuan jinzhun lilu (中国人
民银行决定下调金融机构人民币贷款和存款基准利率) [PBOC Decides to Reduce the Benchmark 
Deposit and Lending Rates and Lower the Deposit Reserve Rate], WWW.GOV.CN (May 10, 2015), 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-05/10/content_2859799.htm. 
273 Since late 2014, the slowdown of China’s economy forced the PBOC to adopt monetary easing 
measures to stimulate the economy, which resulted in six rounds of reduction in the benchmark interest rates 
within one year. In November 2014, the PBOC reduced the 1–year benchmark lending rate and the 1–year 
benchmark deposit rate to 5.6% and 2.75%, respectively, which narrowed the interest rate margin to 2.85%. 
Zhongguo renming yinhang jueding xiatiao jinrong jigou renminbi daikuan he cunkuan jizhun lilu bing kuoda 
cunkuan lilu fudong qujian (中国人民银行决定下调金融机构人民币贷款和存款基准利率并扩大存款利
率浮动区间) [PBOC Decides to Reduce the Benchmark Deposit and Lending Rates, Lower the Deposit 
Reserve Rate, and Expand the Floating Range for Deposit Rate], WWW.GOV.CN (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-11/21/content_2782052.htm. In October 2015, after six rounds of 
adjustment, the PBOC again reduced these rates to 4.35% and 1.5%. zhonguo renmin yinghang jueding 
xiatiao jinrong jigou renminbi daikuan he cunkuan jinzhun lilu (中国人民银行决定下调金融机构人民币
贷款和存款基准利率) [PBOC Decides to Reduce the Benchmark Deposit and Lending Rates and Lower the 
Deposit Reserve Rate], WWW.GOV.CN (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
10/23/content_2952801.htm. Although the PBOC did not further narrow the benchmark interest rate margin 
in the 2015 reductions, the lower lending rate reduced the overall interest revenue of Chinese banks. 
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beginning of 2016 to 2.10% at the end of 2017.274 This poses significant 
downward pressure on the profitability of Chinese commercial banks. The 
return on asset of Chinese banks reduced from 1.1% in 2015 to 0.92% in 2017, 
and the return on equity reduced from 15% to 12.56%.275 To address this 
downward pressure, Chinese banks have had to adjust their business model, 
particularly by engaging in more non-interest-related business, such as fee 
services.276 The party-state’s capture of the executive composition, however, 
might pose an obstacle to the business restructuring of Chinese banks. 
C. Summary 
The Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model comes with special 
agency problems. These agency problems are associated with the current 
challenges faced by China’s banking sector, such as rising risk exposure, 
misallocation of funds toward the public sector, and deteriorating profitability. 
The Chinese party-state might defend that they are merely matters of degree 
and tradeoff and that it manages to strike a fair balance. The rapid 
accumulation of non-performing loans (“NPLs”) in China’s banking sector in 
recent years, however, has sent an alarming signal questioning the 
sustainability of the Crouching-Tiger-Hidden-Dragon model.  
The bank NPL ratio in China has steadily increased since 2013. In five 
years, the bank NPL ratio has increased from 0.95% in 2012 to 1.74% in 
2017,277 almost doubling, and there have been no signs to suggest that this 
upward trend will cease. The pace of NPL accumulation in these five years is 
also worrisome. Between 2012 and 2017, the amount of NPLs has increased 
                                                 
274 CHINESE BANKING REG. COMM’N, SHANGYE YINHANG ZHUYAO JIANGGUAN ZHIBIAO QINGKUANG 
BIAO (FAREN) (2015) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表 (法人 ) (2015 年 )) [THE TABLE OF MAJOR 
REGULATORY INDICATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS (LEGAL PERSONS) (2015)] (2016); CHINESE BANKING 
REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 269. 
275 Id. To be fair, the profitability of Chinese commercial banks remain competitive, at least compared 
to the U.S. banks. The ROA of U.S. banks were 1.05%, 1.04%, and 0.97% in 2015, 2016, and 2017 
respectively, while the ROE of U.S. banks were 9.33%, 9.32%, 8.62% in 2015, 2016, and 2017 respectively. 
See All U.S. Banks – Return on Asset (YTD), BANKREGDATA, 
http://www.bankregdata.com/allIEmet.asp?met=ROAy&inst= (last visited Nov. 5, 2018); All U.S. Banks – 
Return on Equity (YTD), BANKREGDATA, http://www.bankregdata.com/allIEmet.asp?met=ROEy (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018). 
276 Liu Zexian (刘泽先) & Yue Pinyu (岳品瑜), Zhongjian yewu tisu, yinhnag heshi baituo licha yilai 
(中间业务提速 银行何时摆脱利差依赖) [Intermediary Business Accelerates, When Can Banks Get Rid of 
the Reliance on Net Interest Margin], BEIJING BUS. DAILY (北京商报), Sept. 7, 2015. 
277 CHINESE BANKING REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 269. 
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from RMB 0.49 trillion to 1.71 trillion, more than tripling. 278  The rapid 
accumulation of NPLs has posed a threat to China’s banking sector. Since 
2016, the CCP and the State Council have started to experiment with a number 
of ways to reduce bank NPLs, such as NPL securitization279 and debt-equity 
swap. 280  These measures, however, can only alleviate the symptoms by 
reducing the amount of NPLs on banks’ balance sheet. To cure the disease and 
reduce the accumulation of NPLs, the Chinese party-state needs to tackle the 
fundamental cause: the party-state-dominated bank governance practice in 
China. 
V. CONCLUSION 
China’s banking sector has become too big to be ignored, yet 
contemporary literature lacks a coherent account of bank governance practices 
                                                 
278 CHINESE BANKING REGULATORY COMM’N, SHANGYE YINHANG ZHUYAO JIANGGUAN ZHIBIAO 
QINGKUANG BIAO (FAREN) (2012) (商业银行主要监管指标情况表(法人) (2012年)) [THE TABLE OF MAJOR 
REGULATORY INDICATORS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS (LEGAL PERSONS) (2012)] (2013); CHINESE BANKING 
REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 269. 
279 In early 2016, the banking regulators selected six commercial banks on a trial basis: the ICBC, CCB, 
ABC, BOC, BoCom, and Merchant Bank. Since the National Association of Financial Market Institutional 
Investors promulgated the Guidelines for Disclosing the Information of NPL-Asset-based Securities in April 
2016, a number of bank-issued NPL-based securities emerged. By the end of mid-October 2016, the five trial 
banks, excluding BoCom, had issued eight NPL-based securities which were worth RMB 8.1 billion in total 
and disposed of RMB 27.6 billion NPLs. Zhou Pengfeng (周鹏峰), Buliang zichang zhengquan hua shidian 
yunniang kuorong guo kaixing, minsheng yinhang youwang ruwei di er pi (不良资产证券化试点酝酿扩容 
国开行、民生银行有望入围第二批 ) [The Trial Points of NPL Securitization May Expand, China 
Development Bank and China Minsheng Bank are Expected to Enter the Second Package], CHINA SEC. NET 
(中国证券网), Oct. 18, 2016. 
280 In July 2016, the CCP and the State Council, in their joint decision, announced their inclination to 
experiment with a debt-equity swap in China. Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu shenhua tou rongzi 
tizhi gaige de yijian (中共中央、国务院关于深化投融资体制改革的意见) [Opinions on Deepening the 
Reform of the Investment and Financing System] (promulgated by CCP Central Committee & State Council, 
July 5, 2016, effective July 5, 2016), para. 10, CLI.5.275879(EN) (Lawinfochina). In September 2016, the 
State Council declared its decision to implement this policy. Guowuyuan guanyu jiji wentuo jiangdi qiye 
ganggan lu de yijian (国务院关于积极稳妥降低企业杠杆率的意见 ) [Opinion on Actively and 
Appropriately Lowering the Leverage Ratio of Enterprises] (promulgated by State Council, Sept. 22, 2016, 
effective Sept. 22, 2016), paras. 14–16, CLI.2.281762(EN) (Lawinfochina). By January 2017, it is estimated 
that Chinese banks had agreed to RMB 400 billion of debt–equity swap with twenty-seven businesses. Ma 
Chuanmao (马传茂), Wuda xing zhai zuan gu zi gongsi quanbu xuangao chengli zhai zhuan gu jiang jiasu 
luodi (五大行债转股子公司全部宣告成立 债转股将加速落地) [All the Big Five Have Declared the 
Incorporation of Their Debt–Equity Swap Subsidiaries, Debt–Equity Swap Will Accelerate], SEC. TIMES (证
券时报), Jan. 20, 2017. 
 
60 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 28 NO. 1 
in China. This paper analyzes how the Chinese party-state, masked by the best 
practices of corporate governance, shifts the power center to the executive 
team, captures the power center by its appointment and reward power, and 
separates the ownership from control, which results in a Crouching-Tiger-
Hidden-Dragon model in China. It also evaluates the potential problems 
associated with this bank governance model, including the heightened 
political intervention, which may result in poor risk management, 
misallocation of funds, and reduced business innovation and diversity. In 
recent years, these problems have gradually floated to the surface. The 
problems might be controllable at the moment; however, to sustain China’s 
banking sector, some changes or reforms of the bank governance in China will 
certainly be warranted.281 
  
                                                 
281 In separate papers, I explore how China may achieve such changes or reforms. See generally Yueh-
Ping Yang, The Cloud for Dragons and the Wind for Tigers: An Executive-Based Bank Governance Reform 
Proposal for China, 24 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing China to reform its bank 
governance by allowing private capital to appoint their representatives to the bank executive team); Yueh-
Ping Yang, Should the Proud Dragon Repent? Proposing a Relative Theory for China’s State Capitalist 
Banking Sector and East Asian Developmental States’ Experience (Fourth Workshop on Comparative 
Business and Financial Law, New York City, Feb. 2-3, 2018) (drawing reference from the experiences of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in reforming their banking sectors to argue that privatization is 
not the only way for China to reduce the party–state intervention in banks). 
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Annex 1: Major Shareholders282 of the Top 35 Chinese Commercial Banks (2016) 
No. Name Asset (RMB Trillion) 
Major Shareholders283 Listing284 
1. ICBC 24.14 - Huijin Co. (34.99%) - MOF (34.6%) HK+SH 
2. CCB 20.96 - Huijin Co. (57.31%) HK+SH 
3. ABC 19.57 - Huijin Co. (40.03%) - MOF (39.21%) HK+SH 
4. BOC 18.15 - Huijin Co. (64.63%) HK+SH 
5. BoCom 8.40 
- MOF (26.53%) 
- HSBC (19.05%) 
- Social Security Fund (14.71%) 
HK+SH 
6. Industrial 6.09 
- Fujian Province (18.22%) 
- PICC Group (14.06%) 
- CNTC (5.54%) 
SH 
7. Merchant 5.94 
- Merchant Group (29.97%) 
- Anbang Insurance (10.72%) 
- China Ocean Shipping (9%) 
HK+SH 
8. CITIC 5.93 - CITIC Group (65.97%) HK+SH 
9. Minsheng 5.90 - Anbang Insurance (17.84%) - Orient Group &Huaxia Life (5.74%) HK+SH 
10. SPD 5.86 
- SH International Group (26.55%) 
- Fude Sino Life Insurance (20.68%) 
- China Mobile (18.98%) 
SH 
11. Everbright 4.02 - Huijin Co. (53.22%) HK+SH 
12. Pingan 2.95 - Pingan Insurance (57.94%) ZH 
13. Hua Xia 2.36 
- Shougang Group (20.28%) 
- PICC (19.99%) 
- National Grid Yingda (18.24%) 
SH 
14. Beijing 2.12 
- Beijing SASAC (13.92%) 
- ING (13.64%) 
- Macrolink Group (8.45%) 
SH 
15. Guangfa 2.05 
- China Life Insurance (43.69%) 
- National Grid Yinda (20%) 
- CITIC (20%) 
N/A 
16. Shanghai 1.76 - Shanghai SASAC (23.62%) - Banco Santander (6.48%) SH 
17. Jiangsu 1.60 - Jiangsu SASAC (26.4%) - Huatai Securities (5.54%) SH 
18. Zheshang 1.35 
- Zhejiang SASAC (25.04%) 
- Traveler Automobile (7.5%) 
- Hengdian Group (6.92%) 
HK 
19. Evergrowing 1.21 
- Yantai SASAC (20.61%) 
- UOB (13.18%) 
- Nanshan Group (8.95%) 
N/A 
                                                 
282 “Major shareholders” here refer to the top five largest shareholders which also hold 5% or more of 
the bank’s shares. 
283 The shareholders which are shown in bold and italic refer to the private block-holders. 
284 “HK” refers to the listing in Hong Kong, “SH” refers to the listing in Shanghai, and “ZH” refers to 
the listing in Shenzhen. 
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- Shanghai Zuoji (8.11%) 
- Fuxin Group (5.74%) 
20. Nanjing 1.06 - Nanjing SASAC (24.11%) - BNP Paribas (14.87%) SH 
21. Shengjing 0.91 
- Evergrande Group (17.28%) 
- Great Capital Ltd. (9.96%) 
- Shenyang Hengxin (8.28%) 
- Huibao Int’l (6.9%) 
- Xinhu Zhongbao (5.18%) 
- Founder Securities (5.18%) 
HK 
22. Ningbo 0.89 
- Ningbo SASAC (20%) 
- OCB (18.58%) 
- Youngor Group (11.64%) 
- Huamao Group (5.58%) 
SH 
23. Bohai 0.86 
- Teda Investment (25%) 
- Standard Chartered Bank (19.99%) 
- China COSCO Shipping (13.67%) 
- SDIC (11.67%) 
- China Baowu Steel (11.67%) 
N/A 
24. Chongqing RCB 0.80 - Chongqing SASAC (19.34%) - Loncin Holdings (6.13%) HK 
25. Huishang 0.75 
- Anhui SASAC (23.59%) 
- SH Song Qing Ling Foundation 
(10.93%) 
- China Vanke (8%) 
HK 
26. Beijing RCB 0.72 - Beijing SASAC (34.59%) - Qianxi Shihao Electronic (6.34%) N/A 
27. Hangzhou 0.72 
- Hangzhou City (24.16%) 
- Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(18%) 
- Hongshi Group (5.73%) 
- China Life Insurance (5.55%) 
SH 
28. Shanghai RCB 0.71 
- Shanghai SASAC (24.49%) 
- ANZ Bank (20%) 
- China Pacific Insurance (7%) 
N/A 
29. Chengdu RCB 0.67 - Anbang Insurance Group (35%) - Chengdu SASAC (21.92%) N/A 
30. Guangzhou RCB 0.66 - Guangzhou SASAC (22.3%) HK 
31. Tianjin 0.66 - Tianjin City (31.98%) - ANZ Bank (11.95%) HK 
32. Xiamen International 0.56 
- Fujian Province (33.24%) N/A 
33. Jinzhou 0.54 N/A HK 
34. Harbin 0.54 
- Harbin SASAC (19.65%) 
- Fubon Financial Holdings (7.03%) 
- Harbin Technology (6.55%) 
- Heilongjiang Software (6.55%) 
- Heilongjiang Xinyongsheng (5.82%) 
HK 
35. Guangzhou 0.44 - Guangzhou City (87.98%) N/A 
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Annex 2: Executives’ Party Affiliation of Top 35 Chinese Commercial Banks (2016) 
No. Bank Name Listing Chairperson CEO Top Eight Executives 
1 ICBC HK+SH Yes Yes 7/8 
2 CCB HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
3 ABC HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
4 BOC HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
5 BoCom HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
6 Industrial SH Yes Yes 8/8 
7 Merchant HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
8 CITIC HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
9 Minsheng HK+SH No Yes 2/8 
10 SPD SH Yes Yes 8/8 
11 Everbright HK+SH Yes Yes 8/8 
12 Ping An ZH No Yes 4/8 
13 Huaxia SH Yes Yes 8/8 
14 Beijing SH Yes Yes 6/8 
15 Guangfa N/A Yes Yes 8/8 
16 Shanghai SH Yes Yes 8/8 
17 Jiangsu SH Yes Yes 8/8 
18 Zheshang HK Yes Yes 8/8 
19 Evergrowing N/A Yes N/A 4/4 
20 Nanjing SH Yes Yes 7/8 
21 Shengjing HK Yes Yes 8/8 
22 Ningbo SH Yes Yes 8/8 
23 Bohai N/A Yes Yes 8/8 
24 Chongqing RCB HK Yes Yes 8/8 
25 Huishang HK Yes Yes 8/8 
26 Beijing RCB N/A Yes Yes 8/8 
27 Hangzhou SH Yes Yes 8/8 
28 Shanghai RCB N/A Yes Yes 8/8 
29 Chengdu RCB N/A No No 3/8 
30 Guangzhou RCB HK Yes Yes 8/8 
31 Tianjin HK Yes Yes 8/8 
32 Xiamen Int’l N/A Yes Yes 7/8 
33 Jinzhou HK Yes Yes 8/8 
34 Harbin HK Yes Yes 7/8 
35 Guangzhou N/A Yes Yes 8/8 
1. In Columns of Chairperson and CEO, “No” means with no party affiliation, while “Yes” means with party 
affiliation 
2. In Column of Top Eight Executives, the number refers to the number of top executives that are with party 
affiliation. Top executives here include the chairperson of the board of directors, the CEO, the chairperson 
of the board of supervisors, and the first five executives listed in the bank’s annual report of 2016. 
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